Rent-seeking, the police state, and the Arab Spring

The most effective mechanism the Arab rentier state used to protect itself against the winds of the Arab Spring was the redistribution of oil revenues, which were deployed to buy off dissent.

And the storms of the Arab Spring did indeed blow over many of these countries.

None of the rentier states in the Gulf witnessed sustained protests strong enough to shake the foundations of the regimes that had dominated them for decades.

Weathering the storms

These regimes, more than at any time in the past, acted quickly to redistribute part of their revenues, not with a view for a more equitable distribution of wealth for the sake of social justice, but to buy loyalty by satisfying the economic needs of their citizens and buy off demands for more political freedom.

The rentier regimes' cash-based pacification strategy was a success, albeit temporarily. They benefited greatly from extremely favourable financial conditions with the sharp rise in oil prices in the global market.

These regimes acted quickly to redistribute part of their revenues to buy off demands for more political freedom.

The rents earned by some Gulf countries played a key role in derailing the Arab Spring and avoiding the violence seen in Libya and Syria.

Regimes reinforced their relevance, telling citizens that not only were they meeting their needs but were also guaranteeing their safety and security, unlike in other countries of the region.

A major shift took place in the way authoritarian Arab regimes dealt with the events of the Arab Spring.

In the beginning, the uprisings took them by surprise and put ruling classes on the defensive, forcing them to expand their ongoing policies of buying loyalty through increased subsidies on basic commodities, public sector wage hikes, and superficial political reforms.

In a way, the tragedies of the Arab Spring actually benefited the many authoritarian Arab regimes, which regrouped and staged a counter-attack. Rentier authoritarian regimes in the Gulf backed the counter-revolution in Egypt, pumping money and providing political backing to effectively reinstate the old regime, dislodging the democratically elected government.

The Arab Spring in Egypt was transformed from a process of regime change to a process of change within essentially the same regime.

However, oil prices in the global market are now moving in a direction that is unfavourable for the rentier Arab authoritarian regimes and their schemes. Now, these regimes are no longer so certain they can emerge from the Arab Spring unscathed.

The Arab Spring was, tellingly, seen as a strategic threat to the rulers of wealthy Arab states - so their short-term solutions prevailed. These regimes treated their people as though they were their arch-enemies.

Now that oil prices have collapsed, what can one expect? What will be the repercussions of the anticipated austerity measures?

Of course, just as prices tumbled, they can rebound. Narrow security concerns have not only prompted regimes to squander the potential of their nations, but also to corrupt their social fabric by creating a society blighted by corruption and abuse of public funds.

Given the social tension in some countries, even at the height of the oil boom and the policy of purchasing loyalties, the failure of these countries - to ensure the even distribution of these social transfers of wealth or to address the corrupt channels they involved - will increase social pressure.

This runs the risk of huge social unrest, which could follow in the footsteps of the Arab Spring.

However, while oil revenues allowed the Arab oil states to overcome the "ordeal" of the Arab Spring, the collapse of oil prices will not necessarily translate into social protests of the same magnitude seen over the past few years.

Indeed, regimes could lose their economic salience but they have not yet lost their security salience, especially as conditions in Libya and Syria have continued to deteriorate.

The fall in oil revenues will reduce the financial support from the Gulf for the counter-revolutionary forces fighting against the Arab Spring.

This is while the bogeyman that is the Islamic State group (IS, formerly known as ISIS) is being magnified to serve ulterior political motives and prolong the lives of Arab police states.

This has further delayed the arrival of democracy, which means that the pro-security regimes' arguments for their relevance have a lot of life left in them.

Running short

Regionally, the fall in oil revenues, one way or another, will reduce the financial and political support flowing from the Gulf to the counter-revolutionary forces fighting against the Arab Spring, reducing their influence and the adherence of local forces to their cause.

Falling oil prices may reduce the intensity of the conflict in Syria and perhaps even in Libya.

Internationally, the slump in oil prices will weaken the bargaining position of the Arab rentier states in their relations with major Western powers.

Even though the presence of the IS group and its ilk could guarantee the international strategic value of these regimes - that is as security states cooperating with outside powers - Western nations will not hesitate to pressure these countries to further their own interests, and not necessarily to push them toward fundamental political reforms.

The end result of all of this is very dangerous: The rentier Arab regimes have squandered the potential of their peoples and their potential for economic and political development by pursuing a policy of purchasing approval instead of economic development. With falling revenues, these regimes will be more exposed than ever before, both internally and externally.

These regimes did not seek to strengthen their position internationally, but sought to strengthen their position internally instead. They succeeded until the Arab Spring came.

Since the oppressive machinery of these regimes is no longer sufficient and they may no longer be able to simply buy themselves out of trouble, the collapse of the price of oil will remove one useful tool from these regimes' bag of tricks - and this means that all possibilities remain on the table.

This is an edited translation from our Arabic edition.