Why the international response to Syria's tragedy is a disgrace and what to do about it
The Turkey-Syria earthquake on 6 February has so far killed over 40,000 people and displaced millions. The final total is likely to be much higher. Yet one week on, it is clear that the international response to the disaster has been a failure, revealing the limitations and contradictions of the global emergency response system.
As the dust settles and rescue efforts are wound up, anger has been building up in Syria, primarily directed at the delayed response of the international community to assist in immediate relief efforts, both in regime- and rebel-controlled areas.
The delay in response to the devastating earthquake is only the latest instance of the failure of the international system to deal with emergencies. It is hard to think of a single case of UN inaction in recent memory that has cost so many lives. As both Turkey and Syria begin to clear the rubble there is strong case for an independent international investigation into why the response has been so slow.
''The slow and ineffective international response to the worst earthquake to hit the Levant in a century demonstrates that the multilateral system is not fit for purpose in emergencies as in conflicts.''
Analysts have already started to diagnose the issue, concluding that the UN and its relevant agencies have chosen, yet again, to stick to rigid bureaucracy rather than “come up with other creative solutions,“ such as utilising “smaller vehicles instead of big trucks, to better navigate roads and deliver aid without delays,” which could have saved lives. This demonstrates a clear contrast between the UN’s claim that it acts on behalf of humanity, and its operations that consistently prioritise bureaucratic procedures over lives.
Moreover, the slow and ineffective international response to the worst earthquake to hit the Levant in a century demonstrates that the multilateral system is not fit for purpose in emergencies as in conflicts.
Indeed, it took three days for the first aid convoy to enter northwest Syria while UN officials have admitted to failures in their response. Then, it took the United States a whole week to call a vote in United Nations Security Council to open new border crossings to deliver aid to Syria.
Whilst the UN has provided planeloads of assistance to Damascus, regime-held areas were not as badly affected by the earthquake as rebel-held areas. In northwest Syria, the number of deaths and injuries is almost triple the number in the regime area, with more than 4,300 deaths and 7,600 injuries in the northwest and more than 1400 deaths and 2300 injuries in regime areas – these numbers are likely to be an undercount as many remain stuck under the rubble.
Meanwhile, the US, while not objecting to the multiple forms of assistance offered by Arab states to the government in Damascus, did little to push for equal delivery of aid to areas under opposition control. This only adds insult to injury to the inhabitants of northwest Syria after a decade of the Assad regime using aid as a weapon in its war.
The international system has also demonstrated its inflexibility in the failed response to the earthquake in Syria. It has become a maxim of post-disaster relief that local actors are the first responders and this is nowhere clearer than in northwest Syria.
However, the failure of the international community to promptly respond to the emergency in northwest Syria has also hindered local actors from effectively responding to the situation. Days after the earthquake, local organisations, primarily the Syrian Civil Defence corps known as the White Helmets, were conducting search and rescue operations by bare hand without the necessary tools. A little outside help in the form of proper equipment would have gone a long way to saving lives, yet the UN system was nowhere to be seen.
Whilst there are around 20 border crossings between Turkey and Syria, the cross-border agreement restricts aid deliveries to only one border crossing, with a new agreement opening two additional crossings.
Regardless of the renewal of the cross-border aid agreement, there is a clear legal mandate for all aid agencies and the UN system to provide unfettered humanitarian assistance across the border from Turkey to Syria. In the past few days, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar unilaterally delivered aid into northern Syria, demonstrating that the obstacles to international assistance are not logistical or security related but owe to a failure of political will and moral courage on the part of the ‘international community’.
Although these regional humanitarian actors have been able to send earthquake relief bilaterally to northwest Syria, there is a need for more developed and coordinated emergency response mechanisms that can supersede the obviously sluggish and inadequate international mechanisms.
There is an urgent need for greater coordination at the international level, including through existing platforms such as the Friends of Syria Group that can coordinate Arab state responses with the UN system. Regional intergovernmental organisations, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, and the Arab League, should also strengthen their humanitarian coordination and develop joint disaster response mechanisms.
Ultimately, the best long-term solution to avert avoidable loss of life on this scale in future disasters is for Arab states to both invest in local capacities and build robust and agile disaster response systems at the region-wide level.
Dr Ghassan Elkahlout is the Director of the Center for Conflict and Humanitarian Studies (CHS) in Doha, Qatar, and an Associate Professor and the Head of Programme for the MA in Conflict Management and Humanitarian Action at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies.
Dr Sansom Milton is a Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Conflict and Humanitarian Studies (CHS) in Doha, Qatar, and an Adjunct Assistant Professor at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies.
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