Ernest Moret & the double-standards of UK counterterrorism

Occasionally, the ‘wrong’ person – say a white, French, non-Muslim, male journalist with social capital - gets caught in the web of ‘national security’ and ‘counterterrorism’. Suddenly, a world that largely operates in the shadows - because it is created to overwhelmingly target Muslims and racialised ‘others’ – is brought into light.

When this happens, the relevant authorities are quick to show remorse by instigating reviews and inquiries – duly apologising for the ‘mistaken’ targeting of the ‘wrong’ people by a counterterrorism system not meant for them.

This is what happened in a recent case involving 28-year-old Ernest Moret, the Foreign Rights Manager at the left-wing French magazine Editions La Fabrique. Moret, who had taken the Eurostar train from Paris to St Pancras station to attend the London Book Fair, was stopped under ‘Schedule 7’ of the Terrorism Act 2000.

Schedule 7 is a stop-and-search power that allows British police to interrogate any person entering or leaving the UK at air, sea, or land borders for a total period of 6 hours to see whether they appear to be a terrorist. Under the power, the police are not required to show ‘reasonable suspicion’, and so can stop anyone for any reason. Most importantly, the person being stopped does not have the right to remain silent. They must answer all questions asked of them and surrender any passwords and PINs for their electronic devices that can be seized by the police, or risk being charged and prosecuted.

''To prove guilt, the state has increasingly started to invoke something called ‘mindset evidence’ – contextual information that does not prove criminal or terrorist wrongdoing but emphasises beliefs and ideas held by a person which are considered ‘extremist’ and are believed to increase the likelihood that a jury will find somebody guilty of terrorism. So, someone who is pro-Palestinian and believes that people living under occupation should resist Israel, for example, will not necessarily be viewed as a criminal but will be seen as somebody who is more susceptible to supporting or being involved in terrorism.''

While Moret answered the police’s questions at St Pancras station, he refused to give his PINs and was subsequently arrested under the Terrorism Act. He was taken into custody for further questioning. He was released on bail later the same day and was subsequently freed from all charges in June.

Within minutes of Moret’s arrest, human rights groups, publishers, and public figures quickly mobilised to denounce the police’s heavy-handed actions against him. The Metropolitan Police subsequently referred itself to the police watchdog, and the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall KC, launched an investigation into Moret’s arrest and released a report which found that Schedule 7 should not have been used against him; meaning it was an incorrect use of the terrorism power.

Halls’ findings chime with broader criticisms of Schedule 7 and its susceptibility to politicised abuse, as recent cases involving David Miranda and the human rights campaigner Muhammed Rabbani illustrate.

Indeed, Moret himself was questioned on his political views, his involvement with recent protests in Paris against the French government’s decision to increase the pension age and the views held by his friends and associates.

Internal enemies

The fact that this line of questioning now comes under counterterrorism powers is something we can trace to a decades-long view by the British security state that sees left-wing protesters as internal enemies working with external powers to subvert and overthrow parliamentary democracy. This view has contributed to the erasure of the boundaries between public order policing and counterterrorism and led to the increased targeting of anti-racist, anti-war, and trade union activism, oftentimes with minimal oversight and accountability.

We can see the suspicion ‘left-wingers’ are viewed and subsequently treated with in Moret’s case specifically given he was not stopped on a ‘random’ basis but detained in a pre-planned, intelligence-led stop. The police, in other words, were waiting to detain Moret before he had even arrived in the UK.

As part of his investigation, Hall reviewed the intelligence that informed Moret’s stop; it suggested that he was “associated with violent extremism or terrorism overseas, including against law enforcement”. Hall did not comment on who provided this intelligence or how the British police came across it, saying only that “the decision to examine [Moret] was exclusively a UK decision”.

What is equally if not more concerning, is that the police detained and later arrested Moret but without examining the intelligence they received on him. Such a failure not only raises serious questions on the professionalism of the police officers involved, but also on the suitability of the processes meant to safeguard against counterterrorism laws being abused at the border.

The laissez-faire attitude pervading the entire operation is brought into even sharper focus by the way officers misled Moret during his detention. Hall’s report reveals how the interrogating officer asked him to disclose the contents of a conversation with his lawyer – which the officer should have known they had no right to ask given it was legally privileged information.

When Moret refused to give his PINs, the officer then told him this would result in travel restrictions being imposed that would deny Moret the chance to see his family in the future – misleading claims which Hall described as “exaggerated and overbearing”.

The police then proceeded to download Moret’s SIM card despite his refusal to share his PINs. According to the Edward Snowdown revelations, such data would usually be shared with GCHQ under a programme called 'Phantom Parrot’, though Hall reports the police have assured him the data from Moret’s phone has “not been disseminated and has now been made inaccessible”.

Whether the police would have swiftly deleted the data had Moret been someone with less social capital and less public support is anybody’s guess.

Hall’s report says the UK Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) most likely decided against charging and prosecuting Moret because they would not have been able to prove that the initial stop for terrorism was lawful, a pre-requisite for a successful conviction.

Criminalising beliefs

But there’s another reason why Moret was released, which cannot be accounted for in Hall’s report, and reflects the way counterterrorism laws are often applied in a weaponised and racialised fashion, and the way the state has weakened the evidential standards required to prove somebody’s guilt for terrorism. Indeed, many terrorism offences in the UK no longer even require the state to prove somebody intended to commit terrorism.

To prove guilt, the state has increasingly started to invoke something called ‘mindset evidence’ – contextual information that does not prove criminal or terrorist wrongdoing but emphasises beliefs and ideas held by a person which are considered ‘extremist’ and are believed to increase the likelihood that a jury will find somebody guilty of terrorism.

So, someone who is pro-Palestinian and believes that people living under occupation should resist Israel, for example, will not necessarily be viewed as a criminal but will be seen as somebody who is more susceptible to supporting or being involved in terrorism. This would also be the case for somebody who, for instance, believes in Islamic governance when it comes to world-politics. Believing such things are not criminal but they are oftentimes used to be suggestive of ‘extremism’ and therefore supportive of violent groups such as Daesh.

The CPS themselves are far more inclined to view as an ‘extremist’ and ‘potential’ terrorist a Muslim who believes these things by virtue of their racialised identity, and the way it is socially constructed as suspicious. They are more likely to thus prosecute because there is a higher chance of securing a conviction.

But what could they have used as mindset evidence to prosecute Moret in the courts? That he was involved in a political protest? That he was ideologically committed to defending workers’ rights? That he worked for a left-wing media outlet in France? These ideas would rightly be ridiculed and be highly unlikely to convince a jury in a democratic society that they were suggestive of terrorism. But involvement in pro-Palestinian activism and support for Islamic governance would have a higher chance of being accepted as examples of extremism and indicative of potential terrorism that increases the likelihood that such cases would be prosecuted in the courts.

And it is this double-standard at play within the world of counterterrorism that reveals a systematic Islamophobia and racism that allows Moret to walk free from terrorism charges after he refuses to disclose his PINs, but sees people like Muhammed Rabbani charged, prosecuted, and convicted for terrorism for doing the exact same thing.

As somebody who has lived experience of counterterrorism and its overreach, including at the border where I have been detained in pre-planned intelligence-led stops under Schedule 7, I know what Moret experienced was horrid. His treatment shows the ease with which counterterrorism laws can be abused, and the endemic mediocrity and arrogance within the ranks of counterterrorism policing that allows abuse to become a reality so easily.

Whilst Moret’s treatment should be condemned in the strongest possible terms, we should also reflect on the differential treatment he received and the reasons for it as we continue to critique and challenge the security state and its supporting discourses.

Dr Rizwaan Sabir is an Associate Professor in Criminology at Liverpool John Moores University in the UK. He specialises in the study of UK counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. He is author of the book: “The Suspect: Counterterrorism, Islam and the Security State” (Pluto Press, 2022).

Follow him on Twitter: @RizwaanSabir

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Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of The New Arab, its editorial board or staff.