Will Russia play any role in a Lebanon-Israel ceasefire deal?

Despite experiencing strained bilateral relations since 7 October 2023, Israel has suggested that Russia could help it secure a ceasefire agreement with Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Israel believes Russia can help facilitate such a deal by preventing Hezbollah from rearming via Syria, a critical conduit for Iranian arms transfers to the group.

Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar recently underlined the importance of this “principle” for a successful deal. “And the Russians are, as you know, present in Syria,” he said. “And if they are in agreement with this principle, I think they can contribute effectively to this objective.” 

Israel wants Hezbollah fighters and weapons withdrawn 20 miles north of the Israeli border and rendered incapable of rearming. Israeli Army Radio reported that Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer secretly visited Russia recently to discuss Moscow’s potential participation. 

However, analysts outlined significant hurdles to Russia’s participation and limits to what Moscow could actually achieve. 

“Neither the United States nor France, the two major Western actors involved in Lebanon, want to see Russia have a larger role in the Middle East, and especially not in Lebanon,” Nicholas Heras, senior director of strategy and innovation at the New Lines Institute, told The New Arab. 

“So far as the Israelis are concerned, the role of the Russians would be to police the Lebanese-Syrian border region to prevent Iranian arms transfers to Hezbollah,” Heras said.

“This would be an extension of the Russian security architecture in western Syria and would be more about expanding Russian influence in the Middle East than linking directly to Ukraine.” 

Israel and Hezbollah engaged in clashes beginning on 8 October 2023, one day after Hamas attacked southern Israel, killing approximately 1,200 Israelis and taking 250 more as hostages.

Israel responded with its most ferocious ever campaign in the Gaza Strip, killing at least 43,799 Palestinians to date, according to the enclave’s health ministry. UN bodies and legal experts say acts of genocide have been committed during its war.

The Israel-Hezbollah conflict escalated in late September, with Israel unleashing an intensified air and ground campaign against the group, targeting its large surface-to-surface rocket and missile arsenal and assassinating its long-time leader Hassan Nasrallah. 

Over 3,400 people have been killed in Lebanon, most of them in the past two months. Hezbollah attacks on Israel have killed 76 people during the past year. 

Israel wants Hezbollah to withdraw its forces and weapons north of the Litani River, away from the Lebanon-Israel border, so 60,000 Israelis displaced by the cross-border skirmishes that began in October 2023 can return safely to their homes.

Hezbollah had previously conditioned a ceasefire on Israel ending its Gaza offensive but noticeably dropped that demand in October 2024.

It’s against this backdrop that Israel hopes Russia can play a role. The Russian military has deployed forces in Syria since intervening in that country’s civil war in September 2015.

While Moscow has cooperated with Iran and its militias there, it has also turned a blind eye to Israeli airstrikes against these forces and alleged overland weapons transfers to Hezbollah, only objecting when those strikes impacted near its personnel and bases.

Hezbollah is believed to possess powerful Russian-built Yakhont supersonic anti-ship missiles, apparently acquired during its deployment in the Syrian civil war in the 2010s. Last year, US officials claimed the Russian mercenary group Wagner planned on transferring a Russian-built Pantsir-S1 medium-range air defence system from Syria to the group. However, there was no subsequent confirmation or evidence that this happened. 

“Russia playing a role in a Lebanon ceasefire is certainly possible, though probably is not the most likely scenario or likely to be particularly decisive in talks,” Matthew Orr, Eurasia Analyst at the risk intelligence company RANE, told TNA. 

“Moscow would be able to facilitate talks through its strong relations with key regional actors such as Iran and Syria, as well as the longstanding special relationship between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu,” Orr said. 

“However, Russia is likely not in a position to provide decisive incentive or pressure on Iran to get it to change Hezbollah’s stance on ceasefire conditions.”

Russia and Iran have engaged in unprecedented military cooperation since the former launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Iran has supplied Russia with thousands of drones and, more recently, short-range ballistic missiles, and expects a delivery of Russian Su-35 Flanker fighter jets.

The RANE analyst noted that this cooperation is already based on “complex strategic calculations” and believes that adding “calculations on Hezbollah’s demands” could “unnecessarily complicate” elements of it. 

“But more importantly, Russia likely does not see strategic benefits for itself of a ceasefire strong enough to so tightly tailor its arms transfer policies to ceasefire negotiations,” Orr said. “If anything, quite the opposite.” 

He explained that Russia’s arms policies in the Middle East are part of its overall strategy of destabilising other regions and deepening crises to redirect Western resources away from the war in Ukraine.

Moscow also seeks to create additional economic risks to pressure Western powers to de-escalate with Russia. Arguably, Moscow reportedly flirting with supplying the Houthis, which are targeting commercial shipping and the US Navy in the Red Sea, with Yakhont missiles falls within this broader context.

“The continuation of the Israel-Lebanon and Israel-Hamas wars draws from stocks of ammunition for anti-air interceptors and 155mm artillery ammunition that are already in short supply in the West and could be used to support Ukraine,” Orr said.

“Therefore, the idea of Russian interest in the end of regional conflict is likely dubious.”

Paul Iddon is a freelance journalist based in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan, who writes about Middle East affairs.

Follow him on Twitter: @pauliddon