Will Iran retaliate against Israel or hold back?

Almost a month after the killing of senior Hamas official Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran when he attended the inauguration of President Masoud Pezeshkian, uncertainty around the extent and timing of an awaited retaliation by Iran has kept the Middle East on tenterhooks.

Iranian officials say an act of reprisal is inevitable, but they’ve been deliberately ambiguous on when and how such an operation would be conducted.

Prior to the 7 October attacks that triggered the war in Gaza, Iran and Israel had been on the same page about calibrating their proxy standoff such that they avoided a military confrontation head-on.

Sporadically, Israel bombed bases operated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Syria and Iraq. There were also acts of sabotage against Iran’s military facilities and assassinations of its nuclear scientists.

For its part, Iran recruited members of criminal gangs to target Israeli embassies in other countries or kill random Israeli citizens such as tourists and businesspeople. The constraints of the Islamic Republic’s military and intelligence might mean the authorities haven’t envisioned more daring, high-octane undertakings.

When Iran launched 300 drones and missiles on Israeli territories on 13 April in response to Israel’s bombing of its consulate in Damascus two weeks earlier, that buffer was removed. Now, the archenemies are more prone to slipping into unmediated showdowns without being held back by their reservations anchored in a lack of precedent for direct exchange of fire.

Last week, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi told his Japanese counterpart Yōko Kamikawa in a phone conversation that Iran is not “afraid” of the proliferation of regional tensions. He had earlier told Italy’s top diplomat Antonio Tajani that a retaliation had already been decided.

With the humiliation the Islamic Republic suffered of not being able to protect a visiting foreign official, it’s unlikely that the establishment would tiptoe around face-saving revenge. In the current climate of suspense and fear caused by a long wait, the people of Iran and Israel are concerned about a conflagration spinning out of control.

Prior to this escalatory episode, the Israeli public was widely opposed to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu fuelling tensions with Iran. After the April attacks by Tehran, 74% of Israelis surveyed by the Hebrew University said they didn’t endorse a counterstrike.

Attitudes now appear to have slightly shifted as the drumbeats of war grow louder. In a new poll conducted by Lazar Research and cited in the Maariv daily, 48% of Israelis agree that Israel should launch pre-emptive strikes against Iran and its Lebanese proxy Hezbollah before being hit.

Iranians at home have hardly ever welcomed military skirmishes as they’re aware they will be the ones to bear the consequences. The scars of an eight-year war started by the former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein in 1980 seeking to prevent the spread of Shia ideology from the newly born Islamic revolution have not yet been erased from the collective memory of Iranians.

Still, there are Iranians who openly welcome the prospect of an all-out conflict. They include the hardline pundits appearing on state TV to sabre-rattle about pounding the nuclear-armed Israel, emboldened by the enormous assets and influence they amassed under former President Ebrahim Raisi. They also include the sympathisers of the unsuccessful presidential candidate Saeed Jalili, whose approach to rivalry against Israel is one of a fateful Armageddon.

Meanwhile, there are the hardcore exiled opposition figures who keep cheering on both countries to strike at each other, hoping that a war of attrition will leave a trail of destruction followed by the collapse of the Islamic Republic. Neither party pretends that it is concerned about the civilian toll of such a misadventure.

On Ofogh TV, the most doctrinaire state-run broadcaster, a commentator said he differentiated between the missile operation in April and what needs to be done now in retaliation for the assassination of Haniyeh.

“This time around, the intention is not only to flex muscles… a crime has happened, and the price should be paid with blood, which is blood in return for blood. If this doesn’t happen, it means we haven’t reciprocated duly,” he said.

“Blood has been spilled, and the response is that blood should be spilled. The blood that will be spilled should be commensurate with the pure soul that was martyred,” he said, in what shocked many viewers. The network’s pundits often complain about the Islamic Republic refusing to up the ante and deliver a serious blow to its nemesis at a time when its potency is at stake.

Arman Mahmoudian, a research fellow at the University of South Florida, says the Islamic Republic views a retaliatory attack as a bold venture to restore the impaired deterrence it had built up against Israel, but it is also doing the maths about the potential costs.

“If the retaliation leads to major Israeli attacks on Iranian oil refineries or other important facilities, which then leads to a full-fledged war, it wouldn’t be in Iran’s favour,” he told The New Arab. “The cost would outweigh the benefits because, in that scenario, there would be no deterrence left - just war.”

"The archenemies are more prone to slipping into unmediated showdowns without being held back by their reservations anchored in a lack of precedent for direct exchange of fire"

The 5 August trip to Tehran by Sergei Shoigu, secretary of Russia’s national security council, to meet President Pezeshkian is believed to be one of the reasons Iran has held fire. A message has reportedly been relayed from President Vladimir Putin urging the Islamic Republic to desist from intensifying tensions.

Owing to its cordial ties with both Iran and Israel, Russia is in a position to moderate the current turmoil and discourage the two sides from further complicating what is already an untenable regional crisis. If a ceasefire in Gaza is imminent, retaliation ceases to be a life-and-death priority for Iran.

“With a strong retaliation, Iran risks being drawn into a broader conflict that could involve the United States and potentially derail the possibility of negotiations with the West on economic sanctions, a promise made by the new reformist president, Pezeshkian,” said Bijan Ahmadi, executive director of the Canada-based Institute for Peace and Diplomacy.

“A ceasefire in Gaza offers Tehran a face-saving off-ramp that also aligns with their strategic interests, enabling Hamas and other Iran-led Axis groups to rehabilitate their forces and capabilities,” he told The New Arab.

Iran doesn’t have a legal case for retaliation since Israel hasn’t formally acknowledged its role in the assassination, and any retributive action with Tehran’s stamp of approval can render an isolated regime more vulnerable to international opprobrium. The UN Security Council won’t ever give Iran the green light, and Arab nations would be dismayed.

Still, according to Gregory Brew, a senior analyst on Iran at the New York-based Eurasia Group, Iran isn’t probably concerned about “obeying legal niceties”. This was the case in the context of Iran’s violation of six Security Council resolutions demanding that it halt its uranium enrichment activities between 2006 and 2010.

Yet, any imprudent action while the ceasefire negotiations are underway can markedly stain the Islamic Republic’s image as the party that torpedoed the highly anticipated cessation of hostilities in Gaza as the Palestinian death toll exceeds 40,000.

“Iran does not want to take action that might undermine the talks, nor does it want to be blamed if talks fail, but it is more likely that the talks allow Iran a convenient excuse to avoid taking action, when doing so comes with such high escalatory risks,” Brew said.

“If the talks fail, the pressure on Iran to respond may be greater, but Iran's leadership already appears to be reconsidering a significant response.”

Kourosh Ziabari is a journalist and media studies researcher. A contributor to New Lines Magazine, he has a master's in political journalism from Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism. In 2022, he received the Professional Excellence Award from the Foreign Press Correspondents Association

Follow him on Twitter: @KZiabari