Why is Iran sending ballistic missiles to Russia?

The United States and Europe believe Iran has transferred close-range ballistic missiles to Russia for the first time and has accordingly slapped fresh sanctions on Tehran.

The timing of the alleged transfer, which Iran officially denies, is noteworthy since it comes shortly after the inauguration of a new Iranian president who seeks, among other things, sanctions relief for Tehran.

During a 9 September press briefing, Pentagon Press Secretary Pat Ryder confirmed media reports that Iran transferred Fath-360 close-range ballistic missiles to Russia. Senior Ukrainian officials estimate Iran has shipped over 200 Fath-360 missiles to Russia via the Caspian Sea.

The foreign ministers of Britain, France, and Germany slammed the transfer, describing it as “a further escalation of Iran’s military support to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine”.

The US and these three European powers imposed additional sanctions on Iran’s national airline, alongside companies and individuals helping facilitate the growing military partnership between Tehran and Moscow.

Iran’s newly inaugurated president, Masoud Pezeshkian, advocates developing more balanced foreign relations, especially with Europe, and attaining much-needed sanctions relief for his country.

Transferring missiles to Russia undoubtedly undermines these stated goals, raising questions about the true extent of Pezeshkian’s power and ability to implement government policy. Iranian presidents typically have relatively limited power since Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has the final say on all decisions made in Iran.

“It’s not actually clear when exactly the missiles were delivered and when they had been ordered and what the process was like,” Arash Azizi, senior lecturer in history and political science at Clemson University and author of 'The Shadow Commander: Soleimani, the US, and Iran’s Global Ambitions', told The New Arab.

“But we should bear in mind that Putin and Moscow have been understandably jittery about Pezeshkian’s election since he has brought Moscow sceptics such as (former Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammed Javad) Zarif back to power, even though he has also appointed Mehdi Sanayi (as a vice chief of staff),” Azizi said.

“So, this might be an attempt, either on the part of the IRGC (Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps paramilitary) or Tehran as a whole, to reassure Moscow of Iranian support or to gain supposed leverage over the West in any upcoming talks.”

Iran has denied transferring missiles. Despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, Tehran maintains it hasn’t transferred any loitering munitions, single-use explosive drones, to Moscow since the current Ukraine war began.

Incidentally, Ukraine’s foreign ministry announced on 13 September that Russia launched a staggering 8,060 Iranian-made Shahed loitering munitions into Ukraine since initiating its devastating drone campaign against Ukrainian infrastructure two years ago.

Tehran may value the unprecedented military partnership it forged with Russia in 2022 - when the latter launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine and became heavily dependent on Tehran for arms - more than repairing relations with Europe.

It could also be gambling that transferring Russia these missiles, atop the thousands of Shaheds, will gain it access to Russian weaponry and technology.

“Iran is in the position where it can benefit more from a deepening security relationship with Russia than from adhering to sanctions threats from Europe and the United States,” Nicholas Heras, senior director of strategy and innovation at the New Lines Institute, told TNA.

“Iran is deepening cooperation with Russia across several security sectors, including weapons transfers, intelligence sharing, and coordination in the Middle East,” Heras added.

“Russia also is a potential source of advanced weaponry that could benefit Iran, especially the Su-35, but also in the cyber and espionage fields.”

Iran expects to receive Russian Su-35 Flanker fighter jets to upgrade its air force. While it did receive Yak-130 trainers in September 2023, there still aren’t any signs Russia has delivered the twin-engine Flankers.

The Guardian reported on 14 September about American and British concerns that Russia may be sharing nuclear secrets with Iran in exchange for the missiles.

At the same time, Iran has shown reluctance to transfer ballistic missiles exceeding a certain range. When reports first emerged that Russia sought Iranian ballistic missiles in 2022, Tehran was reportedly hesitant to transfer ballistic missiles exceeding the multilateral Missile Technology Control Regime’s recommended limit of 186 miles, especially before UN restrictions on its missile and drone exports expired in October 2023.

In early August, Reuters exclusively reported on Russian military personnel receiving training on the Fath-360 in Iran. The news agency previously cited sources in February claiming Iran supplied Russia with 400 Fateh-110 short-range ballistic missiles but was told by European intelligence sources that there was no indication such a delivery had indeed taken place.

The Fateh-110 family of missiles have ranges between 186 and 435 miles while the close-range Fath-360s has an estimated 75-mile range, putting the latter well within the MTCR’s limitations.

“Delivery of Fath-360s might very well mean that Iran is careful about violating certain limits, not just on procedural grounds but as a broader political-diplomatic note of caution,” Azizi said.

At the same time, close-range tactical ballistic missiles are precisely what Russia needs for its ongoing ground war in eastern Ukraine.

“Iran is going to supply Russia with the weapons systems that it most requires, which in the Ukraine battlespace are short-range munitions,” Heras said.

A timely provision of short-range munitions like the Fath-360 could enable Russia to reserve its existing stockpiles of short-range ballistic missiles for strikes against strategic targets deeper inside Ukraine.

“All of these transfers are going to be commensurate with the state of the Russo-Iranian security partnership, meaning the Iranians will be cautious against providing their more advanced systems until Russia increases the scope and quality of its weapons systems transfers to Iran,” Heras said.

In another twist that may give insight into Iran’s intentions, Tehran reportedly did not deliver the mobile launchers with the Fath-360s, according to unnamed European and American officials cited by Reuters on 21 September.

Two experts cited in that report speculated Russia may want to modify existing trucks for its new Iranian missiles. On the other hand, they suggested, Iran might have decided to intentionally withhold delivering the launchers for now to allow “space for new talks with Western powers” on easing tensions.

“It’s not clear what specifically is in Iran for this deal, and there hasn’t been much corroboration on the Guardian’s story about nuclear secrets being received in return,” Azizi said.

“But the IRGC and the broader Iranian military value their ties with Russia immensely and see it as a particular point of pride that a superpower like Russia now relies on Iran for military help,” he added.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has spoken in prideful terms about these ties, according to Azizi, while telling Europeans that it shows that sanctions haven’t worked.

“But given the cunningness of Khamenei and the return of Russia sceptics to at least some power positions in Iran, it should also be remembered that Iran might think of this as a leverage it has now gained over the West, to be used for a deal.”

Paul Iddon is a freelance journalist based in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan, who writes about Middle East affairs.

Follow him on Twitter: @pauliddon