What Trump's return means for US ties with Saudi Arabia

Congratulating President-elect Donald Trump by phone after he won the US election, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) expressed the “Kingdom’s aspiration to strengthen the historical and strategic relations between the two countries”, wishing the American people progress and prosperity under Trump’s leadership.

Due to regional instability and ongoing Israeli wars in Gaza and Lebanon, Middle Eastern powers are looking anxiously towards Washington to calm troubled waters as soon as the transition period begins.

As Trump’s stance is potentially more radical than that of the outgoing Biden administration, multiple shifts can be expected in Washington’s foreign policy.

Saudi-Trump connections

Trump was closely involved with the Gulf region during his first stint in power and Gulf Arab states may have high expectations for his second administration, especially Riyadh, where Trump chose to visit for his first trip abroad in 2017.

Even out of power, Trump has remained connected with the Kingdom due to various business investments and family connections. In March this year, facilitated by Republican Senator Lindsey Graham who was visiting the kingdom, Trump held a phone call with MBS to discuss the US election, among other things.

In October, Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner then discussed US-Saudi ties with the crown prince. Kushner had played a leading role in determining Trump’s Middle East policy during his first administration, advising him over the Abraham Accords. After leaving the White House, Riyadh invested $2 billion in Kushner's Miami-based Affinity Partners fund.

In recent years, the Trump family has acquired large business stakes in Saudi Arabia and other GCC states. In July, Trump’s son Eric told the Financial Times that the Trump organisation would be involved in developing a Trump tower in Jeddah.

According to Reuters, some key Trump allies such as Dina Powell McCormick, Ken Moelis, and Steve Mnuchin have also maintained business ties with Riyadh and other Gulf powers since Trump left office in 2021.

Considering these close connections between Trump and the Kingdom, there are several ways the new administration could impact US-Saudi ties.

A US-Saudi military deal?

Just before the election, the Biden administration and Saudi Arabia were discussing a security agreement that would not be linked to any broader normalisation deal with Israel. It was also not the full defence treaty Riyadh had been hoping for.

If he wants, Trump could oblige the Kingdom by giving it the sort of closely-knit military deal it has been pursuing for years. The original mega normalisation deal included a bilateral US-Saudi defence treaty and an agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation, but the 7 October Hamas attacks derailed the negotiations.

Under a mutual US-Saudi defence pact, Washington would have been obliged to protect the kingdom from any direct attacks.

“US arms sales to Saudi are subject to narratives which distort Washington's relationship with Riyadh. Misreads of Saudi-Trump behaviour failed to focus on Iran's rapidly growing missile and drone sector,” Dr Theodore Karasik, a Non-Resident Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation in Washington told The New Arab.

He noted that a few weeks ago even the Biden Administration had "OK-ed" a large arms sale to Saudi Arabia, and more are in the pipeline for approval. Therefore, Karasik believes that US-Saudi military relations would continue to be healthy and there is no reason to believe that Trump would suddenly "move backwards" on US-Saudi defence policy.

The Trump administration would likely sell more weapons to Saudi Arabia because of “the underlying potential for a renewal of tensions ‘down the road’ since Gulf military procurement cycles do not change often”. Given Trump’s previous policy, however, there will certainly be some “give and take” with Riyadh, Karasik said, although what that looks like remains to be seen.

Having brokered the Abraham Accords in the last months of his presidency, Trump may seek to realise the strategic goals envisaged by the agreement. But at this point, the Kingdom may hold back from taking the final plunge, as the regional picture is much more complicated.

“Though Trump may push the Saudis to do a grand bargain with Israel, the Saudis are now hesitant to do so because the war in Gaza may cause tensions,” Zeeshan Shah, an analyst at FINRA in Washington, told The New Arab.

“It remains to be seen what Trump can realistically offer the Saudis - though it is bound to be transactional as per his habit, most probably the understanding would be to recognise Israel,” he added. “Even then, it is unlikely that Congress would approve an agreement [US-Saudi military deal] which would completely please the Kingdom.”

Before offering anything substantial, the Trump administration would first have to take forward the stalled diplomatic process left by the Biden administration for a ceasefire in Gaza.

Could a US deal with Iran impact Riyadh?

During his campaign, Trump promised to bring “peace” to the Middle East by ending Israel’s wars in Gaza and Lebanon, although without providing much detail. He has stressed, however, that these wars would not have happened if Washington had continued his policy of ‘maximum pressure’ on Iran.

Trump would likely “follow the same policies as he did during his first administration. And essentially, lavish attention would be paid to Israel, the Gulf Arab states and Turkey,” Shah said.

The Trump administration withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear deal with Iran, and he will likely apply more sanctions on the country. In future, however, any US-Iran settlement that eases tensions could impact Saudi interests.

Observing the big question mark over Iran policy, Shah told The New Arab that while Trump had hinted that he didn’t want a conflict, he would largely pursue a transactional approach. “How those dealings would occur and could lead to an opening with Iran is anyone’s guess,” he said.

On the other hand, any new agreement under the Trump administration that capped Iran’s nuclear program would be a positive from Riyadh’s point of view, Shah added.

Moreover, the analyst said that there have been rumours of potential Saudi investments in Iran, which would be a large, untapped market for them.

A new Middle East

In Karasik’s opinion, both Sudan and Yemen may find themselves under intense pressure to "settle differences" as Trump would lean on Saudi, Egypt, the UAE, and other local players.

According to Shah, the situation with Yemen and the Houthis is largely connected to the war in Gaza, so "the US has launched military strikes against the Houthis even to the extent of using B2 stealth bombers”.

But the Middle East has changed dramatically since Trump left office in 2021, and a lot depends on how he navigates these shifts. The GCC is more unified internally and on better terms with neighbours like Iran compared to Trump's first term. The Gulf states’ financial ties with Beijing, meanwhile, go much deeper than four years ago.

Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are also heavily involved with the BRICS group of developing nations and Saudi Arabia has been granted dialogue partner status in the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). At some point, Beijing’s deep trade and technology ties with Saudi Arabia and the UAE may irk Trump, and it will be interesting to watch how he deals with these new realities.

No quick solutions are expected in the Middle East over the next few months as the US government transition takes shape. During this slow process, the Biden Administration may make diplomatic moves in the ‘lame duck’ period to prepare "diplomatic space" for the incoming administration, Karasik said.

In the months following the election, the US Congress will approve new senior officials after hearings, a process which is already taking place.

“There is a clock ticking on when the US can truly act under the next administration that can run into Summer 2025,” Karasik added, with appointment delays only weakening US policy.

Sabena Siddiqui is a foreign affairs journalist, lawyer, and geopolitical analyst specialising in modern China, the Belt and Road Initiative, the Middle East, and South Asia. 

Follow her on Twitter: @sabena_siddiqi