What does the Erdogan-Sisi handshake mean?

Earlier this month, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Egyptian counterpart Abdel Fattah al-Sisi shook hands in Doha during the FIFA World Cup’s opening session.

Meetings between intelligence delegations from Ankara and Cairo quickly followed, with Turkey’s Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu saying that “in coming months” there could be a full restoration of diplomatic relations.

Another senior Turkish official recently told Reuters that his country and Egypt are preparing to start talks on military, political, commercial, and energy relations.

This significant moment in Egyptian-Turkish relations was the outcome of years of work on both sides to make this “new start” a reality. It is also important to view this handshake in the wider context of regional developments that have taken place since the deterioration of ties between Cairo and Ankara following Egypt’s 2013 coup.

"The rapprochement between the UAE and Turkey has been more successful and I don't think we'll see the same between Turkey and Egypt"

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA)’s current environment looks very different from how it did at the time of Egypt’s 2011 Arab Spring revolution and Mohamed Morsi’s ouster two-and-a-half years later.

“When you look at the region, it’s not populated by crises that are primarily ideological. 2022 really doesn’t resemble 2011, 2012, or 2013 where you could see that there were many resources being injected into fault lines that were primarily definable by ideological differences. If you look at MENA right now, it’s something about territory and old grudges,” Jalel Harchaoui, a researcher specialising in Libya, told The New Arab.

“Compared to today, 2011 was a configuration where ideology played a bigger role.”

Ankara’s policies toward the Muslim Brotherhood are an important variable in the equation. By putting pressure on the Islamist movement’s members in Turkey, Erdogan’s government has opened the door to reconciling with Arab states which recognise the Muslim Brotherhood as a “terrorist” organisation.

“Ankara swallowed its pride and reconciled with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and, especially, Saudi Arabia, aware that those were the crown jewels of Arab affairs. Add to the mix Egypt, which is still extremely relevant, and you have a formula for rekindled diplomatic and economic ties,” said Joseph A. Kéchichian, a senior fellow at the King Faisal Centre in Riyadh, in an interview with TNA.

In a sign of goodwill toward Sisi, media channels in Turkey which previously attacked the Egyptian president suspended all programs that were critical of Sisi after the Turkish government directed them to do so. This has fuelled major concerns on the part of Turkey-based Egyptian Islamists about them being potentially deported back home amid a rapprochement between Cairo and Ankara.

Following the Erdogan-Sisi handshake, some Turkish Islamists have expressed this disappointment. For example, Ali Karahasanoglu, the editor of Yeni Akit, wrote that the picture of the two presidents shaking hands left him “saddened and devastated to see Erdogan abandon his struggle of the past nine years”.

Yet, to be sure, a handshake between Erdogan and Syria’s Bashar al-Assad would truly mark the “final nail” in the coffin of Ankara’s Muslim Brotherhood-friendly foreign policy agenda, especially after the visit paid by the UAE’s then-Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed to Turkey in November 2021.

Factoring in Libya and Greece

Despite the Sisi regime appreciating such gestures from Ankara, the future of Egyptian-Turkish ties is somewhat uncertain. Many experts have doubts about the depth and speed of reconciliation between the two governments. The situation in Libya might dim the prospects for a warmer bilateral relationship.

Ultimately, officials in Cairo see eastern Libya as existing within Egypt’s sphere of influence and Sisi’s government will not welcome growing Turkish influence in this part of Egypt’s oil-rich neighbour to the west.

“Cairo will do everything in its power to end Turkish influence in Libya and no one should be surprised,” Kéchichian told TNA.

“The [Erdogan-Sisi] handshake, although relatively genuine, is going to have very little effect on Libya in terms of improving the situation. Turkey in Libya wants to continue reaping greater economic rewards on a swifter basis in a more rapid fashion,” explained Harchaoui.

"Cairo will do everything in its power to end Turkish influence in Libya and no one should be surprised"

“Turkey has to make an incursion in the sphere of influence of Egypt, which is the eastern half of Libya, whether on land or on the water. Egypt doesn’t accept that because those things aren't easy to share. What does it mean to let Turkey enter the eastern half of Libya? It can only mean a loss for Egypt,” added Harchaoui.

“Egypt has a population of 104 million and it conceives of eastern Libya with only itself as being the number one influencer - the number one interferer in terms of getting involved in domestic affairs. If Turkish companies, a Turkish consulate, or other forms of a Turkish presence start popping up in the eastern half of Libya that means Egypt will lose control. It can’t see it as a happy development.”

Greece’s tensions with Turkey and close partnership with Egypt are other important variables to consider. Maritime borders will impact the trajectory of Cairo’s future relationship with Libya. Ankara wants to improve ties with Eastern Mediterranean countries against the backdrop of rising tensions with Greece and the Republic of Cyprus.

Mindful of Egypt’s role in an energy alliance with Greece, the Republic of Cyprus, and Israel, the picture is somewhat complicated. In a reference to Greece, Erdogan, while returning from Doha, told journalists that Ankara’s “only request” from Sisi’s government is “to establish peace in the Mediterranean, despite those who take a stance against us”.

“Egypt's Sisi is still reluctant to delineate its maritime borders with Turkey because of the longstanding misgivings with Erdogan's regional role and because [of Cairo’s] growing relations with Greece, Turkey's main foe in the Mediterranean region,” Khalil al-Anani, a Senior Fellow at the Arab Center Washington DC, told TNA.

Ali Bakir, a professor at Qatar University and a non-resident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council, explained that “unless Cairo changes its open and unconditional support for Greece, Egyptian-Turkish normalisation can’t achieve its ultimate goals, even if there’s progress in the coming period”.

Looking ahead, the “new beginning” between Egypt and Turkey will probably not look anything like the rapprochement between Turkey and the Gulf states - namely the UAE and Saudi Arabia, which until recently were experiencing high levels of tension with Ankara.

The main factor pertains to the fact that these Gulf Cooperation Council members are looking to “share” influence in Libya with Turkey as outside actors, whereas Egypt is not at all seeking to do so.

“The UAE wants Turkey and [Libyan Prime Minister Abdul Hamid] Dbeibeh to share Libya with Haftar. The UAE is not really taking Egyptian interests into consideration, which says a lot,” explained Harchaoui.

“I think the rapprochement between the UAE and Turkey has been more successful and I don’t think we’ll see the same between Turkey and Egypt. Egypt is too worried, heavy, rigid, poor, and paranoid. It’s not the same thing as a super-rich, small, agile, and imaginative micro-state in the Gulf.”

Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics. 

Follow him on Twitter: @GiorgioCafiero