The United States and Democracy Prevention in Egypt

Ira Kurzban, lawyer of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the Haitian president deposed in a 2004 coup, faced journalists in Miami earlier this year. “Why hasn’t there been a coup in the United States?” he asked.

“Because there is no US embassy in Washington,” he continued, deadpan.

He believes the US was one of the backers of the coup that ousted Aristide. Washington has a history of apparent involvement in similar coups, spanning continents and stretching through the second half of the 20th century.

Does the United States actually support democracy? And if so, what form does this support take? Or does Washington support authoritarian regimes that can protect US interests? Or has democracy become the price to be paid for alliances between these regimes and Washington?

These important questions have been addressed by Jason Brownlee, professor of political science at the University of Texas at Austin, in a study of strategic relationships entitled Democracy Prevention: The Politics of the US-Egyptian Alliance.

Has democracy become the price to be paid for alliances between authoritarian regimes and Washington?

The role of the United States in supporting or hindering democracy is a contentious issue in academia. While some believe the United States must support democracy around the world in accordance with US values, others believe the United States has done the opposite and has aborted many fledgling democratic experiments to preserve its own interests.

Brownlee belongs to this latter group.

He represents a new generation of academics who have studied transitions to democracy around the world over the past two decades. His 2007 book, Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization remains an important reference for academics trying to understand the dynamics and difficulties of applying democracy in countries as diverse as Egypt, Pakistan, Iran and the Philippines.

Oil and democracy

The survival of authoritarian regimes in the Arab world can be explained by many factors, such as large oil revenues, the weakness of internal institutions, and the fragmentation of opposition -but Brownlee points to the central role played by the US in the survival of imperious regimes. One of the paradoxes Brownlee addresses is that, while US support for autocratic leaders was to be expected during the Cold War, the continuation of such support after the fall of the Soviet Union is more difficult to understand. This is what Brownlee considers in his new book.

Democracy was the first victim of enhanced relations between Cairo and Washington, from the presidency of Gamal Abd al-Nasser to the ousting of President Hosni Mubarak. Brownlee highlights surprising facts about US relations with Nasser, a topic on which not much has been written.

Contrary to the commonly held belief that Nasser was hostile to the US ideologically and politically, he was eager to obtain US support and aid to fuel Egypt’s economic and industrial development.

There were high-level talks between the two sides until 1963, after the US Congress agreed to give aid to Egypt under the Food for Peace programme, which allowed supplies of wheat to Egypt, which continues to be the biggest importer of wheat in the world.

There were also plans to provide Egypt with long-term military and economic aid as part of US attempts to distance Egypt from the Soviet Union - but Nasser, eager to appear a hero to the Arab world, rejected this. The Soviets stepped into the void and provided Egypt with food and weapons, bringing Egypt into Moscow’s sphere of influence. Brownlee also mentions a British official’s comment on Nasser’s rule: “This man turned Egypt into a total police state.”

Peace in exchange for freedom

During the reign of President Sadat, “peace for freedom” was the slogan under which democracy was buried in Egypt. After the restoration of relations between Cairo and Washington during Sadat’s presidency, peace with Israel was the top priority. Brownlee summarises this, noting “bold diplomacy always needs strong authoritarianism”, explaining that if it had not been for Sadat’s authoritarianism and the way he imposed his decisions on society, the United States would not have succeeded in transforming Egypt from a strong ally of the Soviet Union into a state subservient to US policy in less than a decade.

Sadat imposed the peace treaty with Israel on Egypt and used every available means to force its acceptance, paying no attention to public opinion, an approach which eventually led to his assassination.

Mubarak followed the same approach as Sadat, suppressing his opponents, forcing them to accept peace with Israel and making political concessions over Egypt’s regional role to comply with pressure from Washington.

Brownlee postulates that US aid to Egypt contributed significantly to Mubarak’s survival, playing a key role in blocking the path to democracy in Egypt and helping create a strong authoritarian regime over three decades. Brownlee also suggests that, over time, the US’ role changed from that of an external power to a direct player in Egyptian politics, influencing the regime’s calculations, priorities and policies. Meanwhile, continuing US support for Mubarak’s regime undermined any domestic opposition.

Democracy was the first victim of enhanced relations between Cairo and Washington

Brownlee relates how negotiations between Israel and Egypt happened under the auspices of the US, which resulted in a peace treaty between the two countries; he mentions that US President Jimmy Carter smoothed over disagreements that almost wrecked the treaty more than once.

Meanwhile, Sadat believed, with obvious naivety, that Carter would stand by his side in his negotiations with the Israelis and their representative Menachem Begin. Carter seemed surprised by Sadat’s confidence in him, saying: “It was clear that Sadat trusted me more than necessary, in comparison to Begin.”

Brownlee argues that Carter bet on the authoritarian Sadat’s ability to impose peace on Egypt, even in the face of opposition from members of his own government, and this is what came to be. Carter urgently needed a peace treaty between Sadat and Begin to lock down success in the 1978 Congressional midterm elections, and he pressured Sadat to limit the peace agreement to Egypt - and not talk about the situation in the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem in order to get a quick result.

After 12 days of shuttle diplomacy, Carter and the Israelis achieved what they wanted - and Egypt was removed from the equation of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

This is an edited translation from our Arabic edition.