Is the UAE fanning the flames of Sudan's war?

The Sudanese government last week criticised the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for proposing that aid be delivered across the African country’s conflict zones without its approval.

Abu Dhabi had called on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to authorise cross-border aid deliveries to alleviate the dire humanitarian situation in Sudan. However, the move has ignited tensions between the two countries, with Sudan accusing the UAE of overstepping its boundaries.

Sudan has repeatedly blamed the UAE for intensifying the ongoing conflict by providing weapons to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The Sudanese government asserts that it has shared compelling evidence of this support with the UNSC.

The Sudanese government had previously alleged in June that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) was intensifying the conflict through arms supplies to RSF militias, who stand accused of war crimes in western Darfur. The UAE dismissed all accusations as "ludicrous" and "baseless". 

The UNSC, however, has recently acquired a 41-page document containing images of Emirati passports recovered from Omdurman, the Sudanese city now back under Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) control, suggesting the UAE had ground forces present despite initial denials.

Sudanese army chief and the country’s de facto leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and UAE President Mohammed Bin Zayed engaged in a phone conversation on 15 July, facilitated by Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed.

The call came in the wake of a significant $817 million bilateral currency swap agreement between the UAE Central Bank and the National Bank of Ethiopia. This marked the first direct communication between the two leaders since Sudan's allegations in June.

Sudanese sources close to the SAF told The New Arab that the conversation could set the stage for a potential meeting in Addis Ababa, but following the UAE’s aid request, the chances for a sitdown have diminished. 

An assassination attempt on Burhan’s life in late July during a military graduation ceremony in Jubayt, eastern Sudan, has soured hopes for a much-needed resolution to the conflict at the US-sponsored Geneva talks, which are expected to take place mid-August and will have Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE attending. 

The Sudanese civil war erupted following the December 2018 revolution that ousted long-time dictator Omar al-Bashir and led to a power-sharing agreement between the army and the Forces of Freedom and Change, a coalition of civilian political parties, trade unions, grassroots movements, and armed groups.

However, in October 2021, Army Commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan dismantled this arrangement, consolidating power with RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti.

In the months leading to the conflict, Burhan and Hemedti fell out over RSF’s formal integration into the military. By early April 2023, SAF troops had taken to the streets of Khartoum, and RSF soldiers were spread across Sudan.

On 15 April, Khartoum was jolted by a series of explosions and heavy gunfire. Both SAF and RSF leaders blamed each other for starting the hostilities. Burhan formed a new government with Islamist allies from former rebel groups.

The conflict has led to the world's largest displacement crisis, forcing over 10 million people to seek safety both within and outside the borders of Sudan, with almost half of the population, nearly 25 million, requiring urgent humanitarian assistance.

How the UAE allegedly fanned the flames

"Sudan is key to the UAE’s strategy in Africa and the Middle East, which strives to achieve the gulf nation’s political and economic hegemony, curbing democratic aspirations in the process," Husam Mahjoub, a researcher and political analyst, told The New Arab.

According to Mahjoub, the UAE's strategy is based on four axes, which include combating any democratic processes in the region, countering Iranian and Islamist influences, enhancing its economic power, and extending its political influence over the region.

“Logistical operations were set up at the beginning of the conflict to deliver weapons to the RSF through networks in Libya, Chad, Central African Republic, South Sudan, Uganda, and via the Haftar and Wagner militias. These supplies were reportedly disguised as humanitarian aid,” he added.

“Additionally, the RSF's business, finance, logistics, and public relations activities are being conducted in the UAE. Even wounded RSF soldiers are flown to Abu Dhabi for medical treatment.”

Mahjoub also alleges that RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo reportedly travelled to several African nations using an aircraft owned by an Emirati royal and presidential advisor.

The UAE's relationship with the RSF predates the current conflict, according to Abuzar Elameen, a Sudanese political analyst. He notes that the UAE has long supported Hemedti, who has in turn sent RSF fighters to Yemen and backed General Khalifa Haftar in Libya.

“Hemedti's rise to power in post-Bashir Sudan is largely attributed to Abu Dhabi's support. This relationship extends to economic ventures, with Hemedti's control over the Jebel Amer gold mines in Darfur, funnelling gold into the UAE and onto the global market,” he told The New Arab.

In 2019, four years before the conflict with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) began, Hemedti procured 1,000 vehicles from the UAE that could be converted into machine gun-fitted "technicals". The purchase was made through Tradive General Trading, a company owned by the Dagalo family and headquartered in the UAE.

Sudanese officials, including Gen Lt Yasir El Atta, deputy SAF commander-in-chief, have claimed that the UAE provides the RSF with more than just land transportation. Reports from intelligence agencies and diplomatic channels suggest that the UAE is sending aircraft to support the RSF, also known as the Janjaweed.

Cautious optimism

Sudanese political factions and several armed groups, however, have expressed cautious optimism following the phone call between Burhan and Bin Zayed, including Yasir Arman, leader of the Democratic Revolutionary Current, and Mubarak Al-Fadil, the head of the Umma Party, two figures that are close to the SAF leadership. 

Political analyst Mahir Abugoukh sees this as a productive, peacebuilding step as a shift in the army’s stance could marginalise pro-war factions, most importantly the Muslim Brotherhood, who seek to prolong the war to thwart the civil democratic project.

“Even if one faction wins, they will rule with the gun,” he told The New Arab. “Steps toward peace must begin with stopping hostilities, then establishing a system of government and a constitution.”

Elameen, however, believes that the UAE should not be trusted.

“It’s not a secret,” he explains. “The accusations made regarding the UAE’s ties to the RSF are true. There’s growing evidence that there is direct financial, logistical, and military assistance that is making it harder for the Sudanese army to wrap up this war.”

By backing Hemedti and other rebels, Elameen argues, the UAE aims to divide Sudan into four separate countries, making it simpler to set them against each other and exploit their resources.

Abugoukh disagrees, arguing that the UAE's current involvement in Sudan's conflict could be part of broader regional and international initiatives to end the war.

“The alliance between the SAF and the Islamists may have helped the army in the first stages of the conflict, but the group supporting the war is diverse and complex, and the ties are already beginning to erode, and the UAE’s involvement could indeed lead to peace,” he told The New Arab.

Elameen expressed further scepticism about the recent communication between Burhan and bin Zayed.

“If I were in Burhan’s position, I would vehemently reject any Emirati involvement in the crisis,” he said. “It’s because of their role that we are in this deplorable position in the first place.”

Mahjoub agrees that any deals struck with the Gulf nation are likely to impose its vision of resolving the conflict, ensuring the RSF's continuation, and preventing the establishment of a democratic civil state.

“While it could potentially lead to a temporary truce, I believe it would cause an even worse explosion in the future.”

This article is published in collaboration with Egab.