Selected, not elected: Libya's multifaceted struggle for power

Since the long-awaited elections of 24 December 2021 were postponed, uncertainty has loomed over Libya as the country's political chaos deepens by the day.

In February, the Tobruk-based House of Representatives in the east voted for Fathi Bashagha to become the country's new prime minister. Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, whose internationally recognised government sits in Tripoli, refused to cede power until there was an elected government.

In the intervening months, and with tensions rising, deadly clashes have rocked Tripoli several times after Bashagha tried to take over the capital before being forced back.

Following these numerous failed attempts to enter Tripoli, the political situation has since opened up for new actors to come into prominence, paving the way for unexpected collaborations. 

For instance, on 12 July the chairman of the National Oil Corporation (NOC), Mustafa Sanalla, was sacked by the internationally-recognised Government of National Unity (GNU) led by prime minister Dbeibah.

"Libyans have continued their call for elections, a constitutional process and the unification of the country's bureaucratic organisations, including the army, while rejecting transitional processes"

The appointment of Farhat Bengdara as the new chairman, a Gaddafi-era figure and banker who is believed to have close ties with Abu Dhabi-sponsored Khalifa Haftar, led many to believe that the move would spark some kind of rapprochement between the two competing sides and court the parliament’s support for the GNU.

However, with post-revolution elites like Haftar, Aguila Saleh, Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, Fathi Bashagha, and Farhat Bengdara all back on the scene, many believe that the power of Libyans and their revolution has failed.

Libyans, like many international and regional powers, have continued their call for elections, a constitutional process, and the unification of the country’s bureaucratic organisations, including the army, while rejecting transitional processes.

But the individual political calculations of Libyan elites and the status quo represent significant obstacles to a democratic election.

In fact, Libya’s political division could be set to deepen further. According to some local and international sources, the head of Libya's High Council of State Khaled al-Mishri and Speaker of the HoR Aguila Saleh recently agreed to form a third government vying for power.

"The idea of a third government — if implemented — would have a major effect on the Libyan situation. But that idea is not at all being implemented for the time being. It is only being talked about," said Jalel Harchaoui, a Libya specialist and associate research fellow at the Royal United Institute for Defence and Security Studies, in an interview with The New Arab.

"Saleh, during his trip to Ankara, has reiterated his loyalty to his own designated prime minister: Fathi Bashagha. So right now, in terms of prime ministers, the situation is quite binary, especially in the Tripoli area," he added.

Neither al-Mishri or Saleh have any power to shift the status quo, according to Sami Hamdi, the editor-in-chief of The National Interest, a global risk and intelligence company.

"UAE-backed momentum has seen a limited transactional relationship emerge between Dbeibah and Haftar that successfully toppled the Head of the National Oil Corporation, Sanalla," Hamdi told The New Arab.

"Al-Mishri and Saleh are not the only ones negotiating the formation of a new government,” he added, saying that "the sabre-rattling in Tripoli, military parades, skirmishes, and increasing visits of officials to Ankara suggest an expectation among the actors that a change of government, or at least a comprehensive reshuffle, is certainly on the cards".

"There may be bloodshed beforehand, however, as militias compete to dictate or influence its composition."

Since both Dbeibah and Bashagha firmly intended to remain in their positions with several armed groups backing each, Harchaoui says the situation "is now extremely military in nature," and "the Haftar family has been coordinating very closely with armed groups aligned with Bashagha — many native to the greater Tripoli area".

Hamdi agrees, and explained that Bashagha's government remains a "useful stick for Haftar and his allies" to beat back the international community and frustrate international mediation efforts.

"Haftar has not made a single concession to Dbeibah. For that reason, it is important to remain lucid and bear in mind no rapprochement and no deal exists between Haftar and Dbeibah," Harchaoui said.

"The Emirati-orchestrated change in the NOC's leadership should by no means be interpreted as a deal between Dbeibah and Haftar," he explained.

"The crisis is already advanced, already militarised, and already revolving around two prime ministers. It is way too late for a third prime minister to matter at all"

A third pragmatist option

According to the same sources, which claimed that there are ongoing talks about a third government, another option on the table is to enable Bashagha to assume power in Tripoli with a reshuffled inclusive government.

According to Hamdi, whether it is called a third government or reshuffled one, "the basis of a third government is a clear consensus among the political actors that elections should be prevented at all costs" and that "a power-sharing arrangement should be established instead to fend off international pressure and actually to hold them".

In addition, Harchaoui explained that “if a third man is somehow designated prime minister, none of the armed groups that matter would pay the slightest attention.”

"The crisis is already advanced, already militarised, and already revolving around two prime ministers. It is way too late for a third prime minister to matter at all."

Saleh and Haftar: Once a friend, always a friend?

Saleh would likely become one of the main architects of a third government in the event it is announced, a move that would not be welcomed by warlord Haftar.

Despite the recent rumours about Saleh and al-Mishri, many know that Saleh has been the primary supporter of Haftar in the past few years.

Even though the latest developments might be seen as something new, in 2020 reports emerged that there was a dispute between the two old friends, which were quickly denied by Saleh.

In response to those rumours, Saleh said, "My relationship with Haftar exceeds any formal positions. There is a difference between disagreement and difference of views. The latter is a natural and healthy phenomenon in all countries of the world."

So, what triggered the divide between Saleh and Haftar?

"Saleh would likely become one of the main architects of a third government in the event it is announced, a move that would not be welcomed by warlord Haftar"

"Haftar and Saleh have fallen out before" and "often wrestled in the past," explained Hamdi. According to Harchaoui, Haftar and Saleh "have never been fully and completely aligned".

"More recently, the ascendancy of Bengdara represents a huge boon for the Haftar family in terms of easy, opaque access to public funds via the NOC. And Saleh has been completely left out in the cold in that regard," Harchaoui explained.

Hamdi agrees that what happened between Haftar and Dbeibah regarding the NOC "does not mean that he supports Dbeibah's government at all."

"There is a sense that there will be a showdown soon in Tripoli that will determine the fate of Dbeibah's premiership."

Ufuk Necat Tasci is a political analyst, journalist, and PhD Candidate in International Relations at Istanbul Medeniyet University. His research focuses on Libya, proxy wars, surrogate warfare, and new forms of conflict.

Follow him on Twitter: @UfukNecat