One year on: The GCC's balancing act in the Ukraine war

On 26 February, Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan made a historic visit to Kyiv.

During his trip, Saudi Arabia signed a memorandum of understanding with Ukraine to provide $400 million in aid, which included $100 million in humanitarian assistance and $300 million in oil derivatives.

In a show of solidarity with Ukraine, Saudi Arabia emphasised the need for a peaceful solution to the war that enshrined state sovereignty.

Faisal bin Farhan’s sudden trip to Ukraine, which was the most senior visit by an Arab official to Kyiv since Russia’s invasion, came on the heels of Riyadh’s deeper engagement with Russia.

"Saudi Arabia's delicate balance between Ukraine and Russia mirrors the approach of its Gulf Cooperation Council partners"

On 12 February, Russian Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Sergey Kozlov claimed that military-technical cooperation between the two countries had “intensified significantly”.

This balancing act received widespread attention in the Saudi media. Former editor-in-chief of Asharq al-Awsat Tariq al-Homayed emphasised that “the Kingdom is playing a vigorous role internationally without being drawn into the game of political polarization” and hailed Saudi Arabia’s “balanced relationship” with Russia.

Saudi Arabia’s delicate balance between Ukraine and Russia mirrors the approach of its Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) partners.

Despite mounting US and EU pressure to align with Ukraine, GCC countries believe this balancing act will bolster their arbitration ambitions and allow themselves to confine their involvement in the Ukraine war to soft power-boosting humanitarian initiatives.

The GCC's balancing act

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began on 24 February 2022, the GCC has refused to back Western efforts to isolate Russia.

While all six GCC countries voted to condemn Russian aggression on 2 March and to oppose Russia’s illegal annexation of four Ukrainian regions on 12 October, all GCC countries abstained from the 7 April vote to suspend Russia from the UN Human Rights Council.

While Qatar gave Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky a platform at the March 2022 Doha Forum and Kuwait was the only Arab sponsor of a 25 February UN Security Council resolution upholding Ukrainian sovereignty, the GCC has typically refrained from rhetorically condemning Russia.

This cautious approach to the Ukraine war has allowed GCC countries to maintain business-as-usual diplomatic relations with Russia. The Kremlin has responded positively to the GCC’s approach and hailed the independence of Gulf leaders from US policy.

A 21 March RIA Novosti article mused about Saudi Arabia and the UAE joining Russia and China’s opposition to a “unipolar order with total American diktat”.

On 7 April, Russia’s foreign intelligence chief Sergei Naryshkin hailed Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s refusal to increase oil production, his rejection of US requests for talks, and overt apathy towards President Joe Biden’s opinions.

Despite this ebullient rhetoric, Russia-GCC economic and security ties have not linearly expanded. During the first nine months of 2022, non-oil trade between Russia and the UAE increased by 57%.

This trade expansion was paired with an influx of Russian capital inflows to the UAE, which resulted in a 67% increase in Dubai real estate purchases in the first quarter of 2022 and the establishment of 4,000 new Russian businesses in the UAE.

"This cautious approach to the Ukraine war has allowed GCC countries to maintain business-as-usual diplomatic relations with Russia"

Saudi billionaire Alwaleed bin Talal’s investment of over $500 million in capital in Gazprom, Lukoil, and Rosneft from February to March 2022 underscored the enduring appeal of Russia’s energy sector for GCC investors.

The implicit solidarity of GCC countries with Russia against Western oil price caps and periodic OPEC+ supply cuts augmented the energy dimension of Russia-GCC relations.

It remains unclear whether this positive momentum in Russia-GCC relations will endure into the second year of the war. Senior US officials, such as Undersecretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Brian Nelson, have warned the UAE against diluting the Western sanctions regime on Russia.

In March 2022, the Abu Dhabi-based Mubadala sovereign wealth fund paused investments in Russia, while the Qatar Investment Authority admitted that “we can’t do much in Russia.”

The abysmal failure of Russian weapons to achieve front-line breakthroughs in Ukraine and secondary sanctions risks have prevented Moscow from striking new arms deals with Saudi Arabia or the UAE.

Moreover, Russia’s expanded military-technical cooperation with Iran, which includes the purchase of UAVs and the potential transfer of Su-35 jets, could strain relations with its GCC partners.

Due to the risks of doing business with Russia, GCC countries are deepening their commercial presence elsewhere in the post-Soviet space.

On 5 December, the UAE commenced talks with Ukraine on a bilateral trade agreement, which would be its first with a European country. In the fall of 2022, Kazakhstan signed $900 million in new investment deals with the UAE and $625 million in investment agreements with Qatar.

These partnerships are likely to strengthen over the coming year, as Central Asian countries seek to economically divest from Russia, and Ukraine courts reconstruction investment pledges.

The GCC's role on the world stage

Throughout the Ukraine war, GCC countries have leveraged their non-alignment to present themselves as potential conflict mediators. After speaking with Putin and Zelensky during the first week of the war, Mohammed bin Salman offered Saudi Arabia’s mediation services.

UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed’s 10 October visit to Russia was partially aimed at advancing a ceasefire in Ukraine. 

While Saudi Arabia and the UAE have failed to steer the warring parties towards a ceasefire, their shadow diplomacy has been more consistent and effective.

In September 2022, Saudi Arabia facilitated a prisoner swap between pro-Kremlin politician Viktor Medvedchuk for 215 Ukrainian Azov Regiment prisoners of war.

"Throughout the Ukraine war, GCC countries have leveraged their non-alignment to present themselves as potential conflict mediators"

In November 2022, the UAE hosted clandestine talks between Russian and Ukrainian officials, which addressed prisoner exchanges and the free export of Russian ammonia on international markets.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE also took partial credit for the December 2022 exchange between Russian arms dealer Viktor Bout and US basketball star Brittney Griner.

Although Turkey remains the preferred mediator between Russia and Ukraine on issues ranging from the Black Sea grain export deal to final settlement issues, GCC countries might be on the cusp of expanding their mediation role.

Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) expert Elena Suponina recently praised the UAE’s potential to serve as an intermediary between Ukraine and Russia.

Oman’s dialogue facilitation role between Iran and Ukraine over Tehran’s military assistance to Russia is a throwback to its involvement in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

As the humanitarian crisis in Ukraine worsens and the war’s detrimental impact on food insecurity spirals, GCC countries will highlight their roles in ameliorating these challenges.

Aid donations, such as the UAE’s $100 million package for Ukraine on 18 October and Qatar’s $5 million pledge to help Ukrainian refugees, are likely to become more frequent.

GCC countries have consistently supported the Black Sea grain deal’s renewal and Zelensky has assiduously courted Gulf investment in the Grain from Ukraine Program, which allows Ukrainian agricultural production to arrive in Africa.

"It remains unclear whether this positive momentum in Russia-GCC relations will endure into the second year of the war"

A potential UAE-Ukraine trade agreement could play a crucial role in securing the supply of Ukrainian grain to international markets, as Russia threatens to scrap the grain deal over insufficient fertiliser exports.

During the first year of the Ukraine war, the GCC’s commitment to multipolarity and harnessing their soft power was on full display.

As Russia’s Donetsk offensive struggles to gain momentum and Ukraine’s counter-offensive escalates in the spring, GCC countries are likely to expand their conflict mediation roles in the months ahead.

Samuel Ramani is a tutor of politics and international relations at the University of Oxford, where he received a doctorate in 2021. His research focuses on Russian foreign policy towards the Middle East

Follow him on Twitter: @SamRamani2