![Gaza war Israeli tank](/sites/default/files/styles/image_360x240/public/2024-08/GettyImages-2089837484.jpg?h=e16de8b5&itok=snur0qE7)
Don't expect Arab boots on the ground in Gaza
![Gaza war Israeli tank](/sites/default/files/styles/image_360x240/public/2024-08/GettyImages-2089837484.jpg?h=e16de8b5&itok=snur0qE7)
Since Israel’s ongoing military campaign against Gaza began ten months ago, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members have been terrified about the war’s impact on the region.
As the conflict continues regionalising and internationalising, Gulf Arab policymakers worry about the wider ramifications, even beyond the Middle East.
A shared interest in seeing a ceasefire implemented immediately has tightened GCC unity since October 2023, highlighting common cause among Gulf Arab states as the region’s conflict dynamics intensify.
In general, GCC members hold Israel and the United States responsible for the humanitarian nightmare, chaos, and human suffering in Gaza. Within this context, any talk of Gulf Arab forces being sent to Gaza to help stabilise and securitise the enclave has been extremely controversial in GCC states.
Gulf Arab authorities have generally avoided even hinting at the mere possibility of this scenario.
Yet, last month, Lana Nusseibeh, special envoy to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) foreign ministry, spoke to the Financial Times about Abu Dhabi’s talks with Washington about Gaza.
She addressed a possible deployment of Emirati forces to the war-torn enclave as part of a multinational “stabilisation” mission once the post-war phase begins. Nusseibeh stressed that Abu Dhabi would only participate in such a multinational force if the Palestinian Authority (PA) extended such an invitation.
This marked the first time a Gulf Arab country raised the possibility of its own troops stepping foot into Gaza.
“The UAE could consider being part of the stabilisation forces alongside Arab and international partners...at the invitation of a reformed PA, or a PA led by an empowered prime minister,” explained the Emirati diplomat.
“The United States should have the lead on this for it to succeed.” She added that the UAE had, “and continued to have, conversations on the ‘day after’ with all the concerned actors in the region”.
Despite Abu Dhabi expressing an openness to the idea of sending its forces to help stabilise Gaza, the UAE and the other GCC members would only do so if certain conditions were met.
As of now, Israel agreeing to such terms is unimaginable. Therefore, without any serious changes on Israel’s part, a deployment of Gulf Arab troops to Gaza remains doubtful.
Ultimately, Gulf Arab troops participating in a multinational force in Gaza would have to face many hurdles under current circumstances. Furthermore, there is no denying that such plans would entail huge risks for GCC states.
Gaza governance questions
The most fundamental questions which remain unresolved pertain to Gaza’s governance. Without these questions being solved, no GCC state will put its boots on the ground in the Palestinian territory that Israel has essentially turned into a no-man’s land over the past ten months.
To be sure, if the Israelis retain full control on the ground in Gaza, such a deployment of Gulf Arab forces can be fully dismissed. There are also difficult questions about which Palestinian leader or faction should be in control of the enclave once the dust eventually settles.
The bottom line is that we are far from realising what post-war Gaza governance will look like, and imagining a GCC state sending its troops to the enclave without these governance-related questions being solved is unrealistic.
In an interview with The New Arab, Dr Andreas Krieg, an associate professor at the Defence Studies Department of King’s College London, pointed out that Israel has thus far not presented any feasible or implementable strategies for the management of Gaza and governance in the blockaded territory during the post-war period.
A key issue is that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government only views Gaza through a security prism that does not consider political dynamics.
“Without a tangible solution to self-governance in the Gaza strip there won’t be security and Israel will not be able to govern the Gaza strip in the mid-term - not even the short term - and call it the end of the war. So, in order to actually effectively end the war, they need to find a political and strategic solution to this. This is where the problems begin,” Dr Krieg told TNA.
|
“None of the Arab Gulf states would be willing to put their boots on the ground in an active warzone. Without a sustainable ceasefire solution and agreement there will be no way to actually discuss the day after in terms of governance and security. So, what the Israelis have to do is show a very firm commitment to a ceasefire and their commitment to [Palestinian] self-governance in one way or another,” he added.
Setting aside such governance-related questions, a theoretical deployment of Emirati forces to Gaza could take various forms. There could be an active UAE military presence in the enclave. Abu Dhabi could also send paramilitary units or private military contractors, which the UAE has a history of using in Africa.
Another option might be for Emirati police or civil defence units to enter the enclave. Yet, some experts point out that without the PA in charge of Gaza, that does not seem feasible.
“There may be an offering of limited police forces who could coordinate with the PA in Gaza, but I don’t expect to see Emirati regulars in Gaza anytime soon. And even a police angle would require the PA to rule Gaza, which right now we're quite far away from,” Ryan Bohl, a Middle East and North African analyst at the risk intelligence company RANE, told TNA.
Nonetheless, if Gaza is experiencing warfare all these options would result in the UAE having to play a military, rather than law enforcement, role in the enclave.
“The main factors that would make such a deployment risky include the following: getting drawn into a long-term conflict that a GCC state would find difficult to extract itself from given the material, diplomatic and reputational risk; the risk of becoming Israel’s ‘policeman’ or ‘enforcer’ in Gaza - in other words, providing Israel with a level of security it is comfortable with, but whilst the GCC state bears the cost for doing so,” Dr Neil Quilliam, an associate fellow in the Middle East and North Africa program at Chatham House, told TNA.
“In this scenario, the GCC force in part replaces the role of Fatah in policing Palestinian society; GCC forces could be viewed by Gazans as an occupying power and therefore the target of an insurgency; and finally, deploying boots on the ground would be viewed unfavourably back at home in the wider Arab world,” Dr Quilliam added.
“The government sending troops would be considered to be betraying the Palestinian cause and it would risk disquiet at home and in the region.”
The nature of Israel’s current government is a relevant factor that no Gulf Arab state could ignore when contemplating any sort of deployment of its own troops to Gaza.
“It’s virtually impossible to see a GCC peacekeeping force enter Gaza in a viable way without a political change in Israel’s government,” Bohl told TNA.
“Its far-right element essentially blocks any notable cooperation between Israel and the GCC on such a front, as the two have diametrically different views as to what’s to happen to Gaza (witness [Israel’s Finance Minister Bezalel] Smotrich’s statement on starving Gazans to death if he could),” he added.
Iran and the region's resistance factions
Talk of Gulf Arab boots touching the ground in Gaza needs to account for how such a development could play out in the wider region.
At a time in which Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain are determined to build on this new period of détente with Iran, officials in these GCC states are sensitive to how Israel’s war on Gaza stands to impact their relationships with the Islamic Republic while key questions about the role of Arab actors in the Tehran-led “axis of resistance” must be considered too.
“Israel’s war on Gaza has served to unite Arab states once again behind the Palestinian cause. Prior to 7 October, there was a significant gap between those states that had either normalised or were leaning towards normalising with Israel and those that remained resolutely opposed to it. To a large extent, the former had de-prioritised the Palestinian issue in their national interests, whereas for the latter, Palestine remained central to national interests,” said Dr Quilliam.
“If Gulf Arab boots were to touch the ground in Gaza, then it would break the current unity and polarise the Arab world and, at the same time, strengthen the hand of the 'rejectionist' states, which would lend weight to Iran and its so-called ‘axis of resistance.’ The balance between conservative and rejectionist states would be heavily skewed in favour of the latter and, as a result, it would lead to an increase in anti-US sentiment across the region,” he added.
Bolstering the UAE's image?
Emirati diplomats discussing the UAE’s potential willingness to send their country’s troops to Gaza appear to be more about enhancing Abu Dhabi’s image as a relevant actor playing an important role in managing this conflict.
While Qatar and Egypt have been the two most influential Arab states vis-à-vis the Gaza war, the UAE seeks to inject itself into the discourse in ways that capture the attention of policymakers in the US and Europe.
“In this context, the Emiratis want to boost their relevance and show the Americans that they have something to offer when they have nothing to offer at this point - and they’re unwilling to offer anything. From an Emirati point of view, it’s just about discourse,” Dr Krieg told TNA.
“It’s about narratives rather than working toward a feasible and tangible solution because at this point - and there’s no blame on the Emiratis or any other Arab state - neither the Americans nor any other Western country has a clear strategy,” he added.
Without the US and its European allies willing to use their leverage to push Netanyahu’s government toward the concessions that the GCC states would need Tel Aviv to make in order to put their troops on the ground in Gaza, Emirati and other Gulf Arab policymakers will lack the confidence they would need to take the serious risks associated with putting their forces in harm’s way in the besieged Palestinian territory.
Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics.
Follow him on Twitter: @GiorgioCafiero