With help from Iraq and Oman, Chinese diplomats brokered the Saudi-Iranian diplomatic agreement last month.
Due to China’s foreign policy in the Gulf sub-region of balancing positive relations with Iran, Iraq, and all six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members, Beijing, unlike Western capitals, was able to play this bridging role, with both Riyadh and Tehran viewing China as a trustworthy and credible mediator.
Just over a month later, China has signalled its determination to build on that Saudi-Iranian deal by tackling other conflicts in the Middle East through diplomacy.
Earlier this month, China’s Chinese foreign minister, Qin Gang, told Israeli and Palestinian officials that Beijing is prepared to mediate peace talks between the two sides.
In separate phone conversations with his Israeli and Palestinian counterparts, Eli Cohen and Riyadh al-Maliki, Qin stressed Beijing’s position in support of a two-state solution, as reported by Xinhua.
"China has signalled its determination to build on the Saudi-Iranian deal by tackling other conflicts in the Middle East through diplomacy"
China's national interests
China is highly determined to present itself as an increasingly legitimate power with an effective and constructive diplomatic role to play on the international stage.
Rather than being a bystander, Beijing has taken note of a vacuum in the Middle East against the backdrop of declining US influence. China is committed to filling this void in pursuit of its national interests.
On top of launching the Global Security Initiative (GSI), brokering the deal between Riyadh and Tehran, and laying out its plan for achieving peace between Russia and Ukraine, Beijing’s expressed willingness to mediate between the Israelis and Palestinians is about building on the momentum from China’s diplomatic initiatives and efforts from earlier this year.
“Beijing can use these initiatives to make a break with its counter-productive ‘wolf warrior’ diplomacy, and take bolder steps to portray itself as a ‘peacemaker’ and contrast its behaviour with that of the ‘interventionist’ United States especially now that Xi Jinping's power is consolidated and his acolytes are in key positions,” explained Dr John Calabrese, director of the Middle East-Asia Project at the Middle East Institute, in an interview with The New Arab.
“I would add, given that China's relations with the Arab Gulf States and Iran are on a positive trajectory, this overture is likely aimed at burnishing its credentials with its regional partners.”
Can China expect success?
Predicting what comes out of Beijing’s diplomatic efforts toward Israel/Palestine is not necessarily easy. Nonetheless, there seems little that China can lose from attempting to play a productive role.
“While it may be too soon to determine whether Chinese efforts will bear fruit, any success to advance moribund negotiations between the Israeli Government and the Palestinian Authority will be a major accomplishment,” Dr Joseph A. Kechichian, a senior fellow at the King Faisal Centre in Riyadh, told TNA.
“Where China enjoys a clear advantage is in reviving negotiations over the Palestinian conflict, especially as the United States, Russia and other world powers preferred, for a variety of reasons, to place it in abeyance.”
It is important to raise questions about what interests the Palestinians and Israelis may have in bringing China in as a mediator. Experts believe that the Palestinian side has more to gain from Beijing playing this role while Israel has no major incentive to welcome any such Chinese mediation.
"Rather than being a bystander, Beijing has taken note of a vacuum in the Middle East against the backdrop of declining US influence"
Nonetheless, given the importance of Beijing to Israel, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government is unlikely to make any gestures that offend China.
“China is not an ally of Israel. The United States is. Both Washington and Beijing attempt to portray themselves as having been neutral. Israelis and Palestinians think and know better,” said Dr Calabrese.
“In asymmetrical relationships such as in the Israeli-Palestinian case - as in the India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir - it is the weaker side that actively seeks third-party diplomatic intervention. Palestinians might warm to China's offer, but I seriously doubt that the Israelis would. Instead, they will politely demur.”
It is not clear what type of pressure China could or would put on Israel to change its conduct. One must consider the extent to which Beijing is Israel-friendly despite its history of standing up for the Palestinian cause in the 20th century.
Although Beijing’s Middle East foreign policy amid the revolutionary era of Mao Zedong was pro-Palestinian, Beijing and Israel formalised relations in 1992 and grew warm towards each other.
Chinese officials disagree with their Israeli counterparts on many Middle East issues, and they regularly raise the Palestinian struggle and condemn Israeli belligerence towards the Palestinians and other Arab states in international fora, but Beijing’s stances against Israel do not go beyond rhetoric and symbolic acts.
The strength of modern-day Sino-Israeli relations helps one understand the limits to China’s commitment to the Palestinian struggle. China sees close ties with Israel, as a wealthy and innovative country, as beneficial to the Asian giant’s interests in terms of economics, trade, investment, construction, education, and technology.
In fact, Israel and China have grown close enough to the point whereby Washington has in recent years put pressure on Tel Aviv to cool its ties with Beijing.
Questions of leverage and commitment to investing resources
There is no denying that China brokering the Saudi-Iranian diplomatic agreement last month was possible in no small part due to Beijing’s influence over Riyadh and Tehran. But in the case of Israel/Palestine, the picture differs significantly.
“As an analyst, I cannot blame China for attempting to cash in its 10 March accomplishment in the Gulf. However, with all due respect to Chinese diplomacy, the Arab-Israeli conflict is a totally different ball game,” said Dr Khalil E. Jahshan, a Palestinian-American political analyst and media commentator who serves as Executive Director of Arab Center Washington DC, in a TNA interview.
"I am not confident that Beijing has sufficient historical expertise and leverage to be as an effective mediator between Israel and Palestine, as it did between Riyadh and Tehran"
“I am not confident that Beijing has sufficient historical expertise and leverage to be as an effective mediator between Israel and Palestine, as it did between Riyadh and Tehran.”
Ultimately, financial resources and time are likely the biggest challenges that Beijing will face when attempting to mediate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
“Peace processing in the Arab Israeli arena has been an extremely expensive and, at the same time, an extremely time-consuming process. I am not sure Beijing is capable or willing to dedicate the extensive time needed, at the top levels of government, to reach a satisfactory outcome in this conflict,” stated Dr Jahshan.
“But I am sure that China is not willing to pay the heavy bill needed to achieve the same. The US, for example, has invested more than USD 150 billion in Israel alone, in addition to equally significant peace-related amounts in Egypt, Jordan, and Palestine, to name just a few recipients. In other words, China cannot mediate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the cheap. That will be a serious challenge.”
Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics.
Follow him on Twitter: @GiorgioCafiero