Assessing Iran, Russia, and Turkey's tough trilateral talks

On 19 July, Putin embarked on his second foreign visit since invading Ukraine, this time to Tehran, where he met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi.

For years, Russia and Iran have been steadily building a relationship that has stretched beyond simple pragmatic cooperation to a deeper strategic partnership that opposes the United States.

Following US President Joe Biden’s regional trip, president Putin was demonstrating that Russia is not isolated and is still a critical country in dealing with the Middle East.

Along with the issue of international sanctions, the trilateral summit also addressed oil production, Ukraine, Syria, and wheat exports.

Increased security and economic cooperation

For Russia and Iran, the diplomatic and economic gains from the meeting were a moment to herald closer ties between the two countries in the face of Western pressure.

“From the Iranian perspective, you could say that there were a few potential gains: the optics of hosting a high-level summit, and in the case of Syria, conveying opposition to Turkish military moves in the north,” Naysan Rafati, an analyst at the International Crisis Group (ICG), told The New Arab.

"Following Joe Biden's regional trip, Putin was demonstrating that Russia is not isolated and is still a critical country in dealing with the Middle East"

Rafati noted that the summit’s announcement of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) between Iran's national oil company and Gazprom supports the argument Tehran makes about opportunities for economic development notwithstanding US sanctions and absent a nuclear deal.

“But how much of the investment actually materialises is a different question, and in the meantime, there seems to be quite a bit of competition between Russia and Iran in oil and exports where they overlap,” said Rafati.

As for discussions on security matters, Erdogan’s wish to carry out a new military operation in Syria is staunchly opposed by both Iran and Russia. The latter two would rather see Syria’s territory come back under the total control of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Damascus.

“What we expect from Russia and Iran is their support for Turkey in its fight against terrorism,” Erdogan remarked. He noted that an agreement reached in 2019 with Russia and the United States was supposed to have seen Kurdish militias in Syria pushed back 19 miles from the border area, a condition which Turkey says was never fully implemented.

The United States and Russia, although both on opposing sides of the Syrian conflict, do not wish to see a new Turkish offensive into northern Syria.

Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei told Erdogan that Iran was ready to help Turkey fight terrorism, but insisted that any kind of operation would hurt Syria and Turkey, as well as the whole region.

Indeed, Putin indicated that Russia and Iran were ready to increase cooperation on international security. The White House even alleged that Russian officials were in Iran to acquire drones to use in Ukraine.

A delicate balance in Syria

Turkey’s main target, the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) coalition, is regarded by Ankara as a terrorist organisation due to its political connections to the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) and its imprisoned leader, Abdullah Öcalan.

Iain MacGillivray, an analyst with the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) in Washington DC who focuses on Turkey and the Middle East, told The New Arab that, so far, framing the Kurdish mobilisation in northern Syria as a domestic problem has been a successful strategy for Erdogan.

“The Turkish economy is in dire straits and many Turks are feeling the squeeze as inflation increases to over 70%,” he told The New Arab.

“A win against Kurdish groups and consolidation of more territory may bring some needed support as his AKP and Erdogan personally plummets in the polls,” MacGillivray added.

“There are rumours of an early election but the vote is scheduled for 2023 and Erdogan’s foreign policy is the only strategy he has left as the economy tumbles and Turkey lurches from mishap to mishap.”

"From the Iranian perspective, you could say that there were a few potential gains: the optics of hosting a high-level summit, and in the case of Syria, conveying opposition to Turkish military moves in the north"

In northern Syria, the SDF currently holds the strategic towns of Tal Rifaat, Manbij, and Kobane, which are now being directly threatened by Turkey and its local Syrian allies. Iran is also concerned about two Shia villages near Tal Rifaat, Nubl and al-Zahra, which are also at risk of being overrun by Turkish-backed forces.

In response, the SDF has established a joint-operations room called “North Thunderbolt” with the Iranian-backed Fatemiyoun militia and the Syrian regime’s Baath Brigades.

On 15 July, the SDF’s Commander, General Mazloum Abdi, stated that they were increasing their defences along the border region with the help of the Assad regime in order to resist a Turkish incursion.

Russian General Aleksandr Chaiko, the commander of Russian forces in Syria, also led a military delegation to the SDF-held city of Qamishli to facilitate a meeting between the SDF and the Syrian regime.

Is a Syrian deal on the table?

Despite Turkey and Russia backing opposite sides in the conflict, the two countries have been carrying out joint patrols in certain areas since 2019.

The three countries are also participants in the Astana peace process, which is aimed at resolving the Syrian conflict.

Since the Syrian crisis is nearly completely absent from the US diplomatic agenda, the Russians, Turks, and Iranians could theoretically work together to deescalate and find a solution of their own accord.

Following the Tehran summit, Putin said that Iran and Turkey would utilise the Astana format for peace talks and noted that the Syrian government and opposition, along with Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon, as well as the UN, could also take part.

But years of peace negotiations between the Syrian government and opposition have shown little results. The Syrian regime itself just scuttled talks with the opposition that were facilitated by the UN to draft a new constitution.

Some have suggested that the talks in Tehran could see Russia and Iran agree to a Turkish military operation that would be limited in scope or secure a territorial exchange in order to ward off a new round of fighting.

But it is “unlikely that Erdogan will give up territory already occupied as Turkey has been successful in all of its previous incursions into Northern Syria with minimal fall out domestically, regionally, and internationally,” MacGillivray said.

Hamidreza Azizi, a CATS fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, told The New Arab, “There might be a deal between the Syrian regime, the Kurds, and Turkey so the extent of a potential operation would be restricted or, in the best case scenario, Turkey would refrain from conducting any kind of operation altogether”.

Azizi added, “Whatever happens, right now it would be related to Tal Rifaat and Manbij. Any kind of successful agreement between Turkey and the Syrian regime could pave the way for future understandings or a kind of normalisation down the road, but that’s a huge step, so we need to lower our expectations”. 

In the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it appeared going into the talks that Turkey had the upper hand over Russia, given Moscow’s significant isolation from the global economy. In what appears to be a continuing tradition between the two leaders, Erdogan supposedly made Putin wait alone for nearly a minute in front of the cameras in order to embarrass him.

Regarding a new Turkish offensive in Syria, MacGillivray said, “Erdogan will likely go it alone if there is no support or sanction from either Iran or Russia. Russia’s focus on the Ukrainian conflict means that Russia needs Turkey more these days, even as a means to undermine what has become a stronger and more cohesive NATO in the face of Russian aggression”.

"Since the Syrian crisis is nearly completely absent from the US diplomatic agenda, the Russians, Turks, and Iranians could theoretically work together to deescalate and find a solution of their own accord"

A potential military operation would also test US-Turkish ties, given that the US military is present in eastern Syria, working with the SDF in a continuing counter-terrorism capacity. Still, Washington also needs Turkish support vis-à-vis Ukraine.

However, Russia has its own cards to play in order to pressure Turkey. The United Nations Security Council was unable to extend the UN’s humanitarian mission to Syria’s Idlib Province due to Russia’s veto power.

Russian diplomats have adamantly pushed back on a routine extension of the UN’s delivery of essential aid through the Bab al-Hawa border crossing to some four million displaced Syrians in the province due to their insistence that Turkey must do more to reduce the power of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in Idlib.
 
The UN eventually reached an agreement on a six-month extension of the aid mission.

Both Russia and the Syrian regime have increased their attacks on HTS in recent weeks, although a shaky ceasefire technically remains in effect since 2020.

How the trilateral talks play out on the ground in Syria will be seen in the coming months.

Christopher Solomon is a Middle East analyst, researcher, editor, and writer based in the Washington DC area. He works for a US defence consultancy and is the author of the book, In Search of Greater Syria (I.B. Tauris/Bloomsbury). Christopher is a Co-Editor for Syria Comment and a contributor to the Economist Intelligence Unit. 

Follow him on Twitter: @Solomon_Chris