If the UK really wants to end Sudan war, it must target RSF funding

The humanitarian catastrophe taking place in Sudan today, from which no one is likely to emerge unscathed, has engendered a political awakening among broad segments of the Sudanese public who previously showed little interest in domestic affairs - let alone international one.

People have become fully aware that how this war will end doesn't simply depend on local actors and their actions – but an array of international powers who have their own geopolitical designs and ambitions when it comes to Sudan's future.

Moreover, they have realised since the first weeks of the war, that when Mohammad Hamdan Daglo (Hemedti) initiated the current armed conflict by launching his attack on army positions on 15 April 2023, it was far from a knee-jerk response to what he believed were plans to oust him.

On the contrary, it's now clear this move was carefully planned and closely followed by outside parties who viewed his leadership - alongside a cohort of "acceptable" politicians - as more aligned with their interests than other possible scenarios.

Despite the immense suffering, and the urgent desire of the vast majority of the Sudanese population to return to normal life, the humanitarian pretensions of the British draft resolution voted on recently at the UN Security Council, which called for an immediate end to "hostile actions" and the "protection of civilians" didn’t manage to fool the Sudanese people.

For the Western-aligned elite who tried to promote the UK draft resolution in advance - attempting to convince the public that the current catastrophe will only end through international intervention - the failure of the British resolution was frustrating; even more so due to the positive response of many Sudanese to Russia's veto.

The general public, whom the Westernised elite view as ignorant or immature masses with no idea what's in their own interests, have shown great insight in rejecting a gamble on the Western vision.

One need not be an expert in international relations or UN Security Council affairs to understand that when particular enthusiasm is shown by any of the core states, this never springs merely from sympathy for citizens.

It's vital also to mention that Britain, which has been working so eagerly to advance a plan for ending the Sudan war, as it has stated repeatedly, is not a mere observer or a neutral and concerned bystander. The UK has in fact been an active player in Sudanese politics since ex-President Omar Bashir was toppled in 2019.

It's impossible to forget the pivotal role played by Britain’s Ambassador during the first phase of the transitional period, when the "Forces of Freedom and Change" took control of the government. He was even jokingly referred to as the "Governor General" at the time.

As the humanitarian crisis in Sudan intensifies, sexual violence is used to terrorise women & girls. International solidarity is needed, writes @Ninamasore

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It's hard to believe that this active player, in light of the various roles it has played, and all the support and planning assistance it has consistently provided to specific political groups since the 2019 sit-in at the army headquarters, doesn't have an agenda. In other words, it is impossible to accept that what is motivating the UK is simply a desire to end the carnage.

Another detail worth pointing out is that Britain's proposal for international intervention to "protect and assist" the Sudanese people didn't emerge in the days after the war erupted, but actually pre-dates it. In fact, it came about as soon as Abdalla Hamdok's government was formed.

The British placed its bets on this government, viewing Hamdok as a friendly figure in a country full of people who view the West with a high degree of scepticism. At the time, it seems to have been expected that his government would request international intervention in order to implement the political, technical, legal, and security requirements of the transition. They obligingly did so through an official letter addressed to the UN which was only withdrawn after its leaked contents shocked and angered the public because they saw it as tantamount to an invitation for Sudan's re-occupation.

Britain, an ex-coloniser and the original foreign player in Sudanese politics, shares with its local allies a hostile view towards Sudan's military establishment. The two parties, Britain and its Sudanese allies, appear to view the army as responsible for thwarting their political project, which raises questions about their possible complicity and alignment with leading figures from the RSF.

While Britain and its allies appear comfortable with the army's sidelining and exhaustion, what is much more dangerous is that they seem to believe their political aspirations may be more likely achieved if Hemedti wins.

Some might argue that international powers - like the UK - could genuinely be motivated by a humanitarian impulse without concealing a hidden agenda. However, the problem here is Israel, whose actions have left no doubt that genuine concern and goodwill will ever be the decisive factors in prompting calls for "international justice" by the centres of power.

Indeed, those countries now doggedly targeting the Sudanese army - attempting to stigmatise it and equate it with the RSF using the pretext of "concern for civilian casualties" during the bombardment - are the very same countries which endlessly repeat that the Israeli army has the right to use any level of force it deems suitable to "defend itself". Not to mention, they absolutely refuse to condemn Israel's conduct or even to exert the slightest pressure on it to halt its atrocities.

It is this screaming double standard, which can no longer be concealed or denied, and which has caused scepticism towards the legitimacy of international institutions to explode (even in Western states), that has led to a deeply negative perception among the general population towards any initiative backed by those countries.

Furthermore, Sudan is all too familiar with UN forces in its territory. During past periods of pressure and under various pretexts, among which was the spread of armed violence in Darfur, the deployment of an international UN force was accepted – to help stop the violations and protect civilians.

However, these forces (UNAMID) didn't succeed in quelling the violence, nor even in protecting themselves. Instead, their presence had various negative repercussions - although not for the UNAMID members and staffers, many of whom enjoyed immunities, privileges and high salaries.

Finally, any solution for the crisis in Sudan which aims to bring an end to the war is unacceptable if it equivalises between the army and the Janjaweed gangs. It is also unacceptable to seek forcing the political leadership to re-absorb these elements given they have openly displayed their abject criminality to monitoring bodies, as well as to credible local and international organisations.

Anyone honest about their desire to take action to protect civilians must start by blocking the sources of funding to the RSF militia and punishing those involved in providing it with resources, including weapons.

Mada El Fatih is a Sudanese writer, researcher and ex-diplomat based in Paris, who writes for Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, The New Arab's Arabic-language sister publication.

This is an edited translation from our Arabic edition. To read the original article click here.

Translated by Rose Chacko

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Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of The New Arab, its editorial board or staff, or the author's employer.