After the death of six Israeli captives in Gaza, and instead of caving to the mounting internal and external pressure to allow a ceasefire deal with Hamas, Netanyahu presented a map to explain to Israelis the importance of the Philadelphi Corridor between Gaza and Egypt, and why the Israeli army should remain there.
Netanyahu was called untethered from reality for setting up this ‘newly found’ corridor, after it was left untouched for seven months following the commencement of the ground offensive, to curtail any ceasefire deal with Hamas.
No deal means no end in sight for the war. A prolonged war only serves Benjamin Netanyahu's grip on power and shields him from long-awaited corruption charges.
The fact that a majority of Israelis want a ceasefire deal to retrieve their captives, and that Netanyahu is predicted to lose the sufficient quote to form a coalition in the next Knesset election, only hardens his position to preserve the status quo.
One way, or perhaps the only way, to keep the situation in an ongoing spiral is by remaining evasive about the day after the war, and I use the word ‘war’ reservedly.
As of late December last year, Israel’s National Security Council held multiple discussions about the ‘day after’. None saw tangible ministerial engagement to move forward towards concrete steps.
The closest to a post-war plan came in February, with Netanyahu envisioning indefinite security control of the Strip and allocating the running of civilian affairs to the local Palestinians "with no links to hostile groups" to Israel. Gaza clans shunned the plan as mere outsourcing of the occupation to the occupied.
The ambiguity of those plans is deliberate. They serve to absorb international pressure and, more importantly, give Israel a scope to re-assess its so-far failed goals to have full security control over Gaza.
"After we have destroyed Hamas, Gaza will be demilitarized under Israeli security control," said Netanyahu last November. He repeatedly opposed the return of the Palestinian Authority to rule Gaza.
What Bibi sees is a rare opportunity to re-align history, or rather, reinstate the original Zionist timeline which PM Ariel Sharon’s Gaza Disengagement plan had ostensibly disrupted in 2005. The plan saw the removal of 7000 settlers from the Gaza Strip and the dismantlement of settlements and military bases that took over nearly 40% of the Gaza Strip’s geography.
Netanyahu's genocidal prophecy in Gaza
Sharon — like the late PM Yitzhak Rabin who wished the sea would swallow Gaza — came to realise that Gaza’s security risk and demographic reality outweighed the value of the existence of Israeli settlements in it.
Netanyahu, then Sharon’s Finance Minister, resigned from the government in protest.
Settlers are already looking up to Netanyahu’s vows to reimpose military rule over Gaza as a chance to rebuild the settlements of Gush Katif and Netzarim and kick Palestinians out of their homes in what some of them proudly call ‘Second Nakba’. Others have their eyes set on Gaza beachfront as an investment opportunity.
The alignment of Netanyahu’s worldview with the settlers fuels his plans as implementable. These plans have become increasingly evident in the past weeks.
Israeli Channel 12 said early this month that “Netanyahu's insistence on keeping a military presence in the Philadelphi Corridor “could lead to Israel’s real plan for Gaza, which is a return to military rule.”
Videos showing the Israeli army paving a road alongside the border with Egypt is a message to Palestinians and Egypt — a key mediator in the ceasefire negotiations and unhappy about Israeli presence on its Gaza border — that the Israeli army is there to stay.
This continues the Netzarim Corridor's continuous expansion, south of Gaza City and turns it into a restricted military zone that stops people from going back to their homes in northern Gaza while functioning as a base to raid residential areas at will and swiftly, much like in the West Bank.
Sure, one can dismiss all these moves as operational necessities or tactical manoeuvres to pressure Hamas towards a ceasefire deal that meets Israel’s so-called demands. We can even go further to downplay the settlers’ aspirations as messianic fantasy.
However, those rather incremental military moves have been the norm in the West Bank and resulted in the usurpation of more Palestinian land, ghettoisation of Palestinian residential centres, and ignited a spike in the illegal Jewish settlers’ population and Jewish terrorism in the region.
The takeover plans in Gaza since October have been changed and readjusted repeatedly subject to the ground and international positions. With Egypt standing firm against any Israeli attempt to push Palestinians into Sinai, it is possible Israel has moved from an all-out expulsion of Gazans to a gradual military control starting in Northern Gaza. Should the international atmosphere allow, ethnic cleansing will follow.
Against the reservations of Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi — due to logistical concerns — Netanyahu is appointing Brig. Gen. Elad Goren to oversee the distribution of aid in Gaza. This means Israel's running of local affairs and, eventually, marginalisation of international organisations, certainly the UNRWA, which Tel Aviv has targeted systematically from day one of the war.
This is only the tip of the iceberg. Haaretz revealed that the Israeli government has commenced the so-called ‘phase two’ in its Gaza operations.
It involves taking full control of northern Gaza all the way to the Netzarim Corridor. The success of the operation — be it through systematic starvation of the local population as Major General Giora Eiland suggested or through sheer military force — northern Gaza will be annexed to Israel and settlements built there.
Netanyahu wants to go down in history as the one who made Israel ‘whole’. And do not be fooled by the army’s opposition to permanent military presence in Gaza. It is about the resources and personnel management — as Defence Minister Yoav Gallant stated — and not the idea of usurping Gaza itself.
Missing from Netanyahu’s 'day after' plans is the day after direct military occupation. Rabin and Sharon understood that controlling Gaza was a losing security bargain. That happened when the Gaza population was a fraction of what is now, and when Gazans were less outraged and far less bereaved.
Dr Emad Moussa is a Palestinian-British researcher and writer specialising in the political psychology of intergroup and conflict dynamics, focusing on MENA with a special interest in Israel/Palestine. He has a background in human rights and journalism, and is currently a frequent contributor to multiple academic and media outlets, in addition to being a consultant for a US-based think tank.
Follow him on Twitter: @emadmoussa
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