US should pursue a political settlement to Yemen crisis

On Thursday, 26 March 2015, US Secretary of State John Kerry took time from his intense negotiations with his Iranian counterpart, Jawad Zarif, and spoke via conference call with his Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to discuss the shattering explosion of Yemen, and, we were told, to commend the work of the coalition that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has put together and is leading in an unprecedented military action against the Ansar Allah movement, better known as the "Houthis." When we pressed acting State Department spokesman Jeffery Rathke during the Daily Press Briefing on the US position, Rathke said Washington has been unequivocal in its support for the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen, despite recent GCC criticisms of US policy in the Middle East, especially with regard to Syria and the Iran nuclear talks.

The US, according to Rathke, is providing intelligence sharing, targeting assistance, advisory and logistical support for the three-day old Saudi-led military intervention.

Yemen sits on the strategic Bab al-Mandeb straits, through which millions of barrels of oil pass every day on their way to Europe.

Although not many Washington experts believe that Arab willingness to participate in the US-led coalition against the Islamic State group (IS) in Iraq and Syria played a role in this US support to the Saudi led coalition in Yemen, almost everyone agrees that the US has important interests in this impoverished country.

Strategic importance

According to Anthony Cordesman, Washington's preeminent military and strategic scholar and analyst at the prestigious Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), "Yemen is of major strategic importance to the US, as is the broader stability of Saudi Arabia all of the Arab Gulf states. For all of the talk of US energy 'independence,' the reality remains very different. The increase in petroleum and alternative fuels outside the Gulf has not changed its vital strategic importance to the global and US economy."

Cordesman points out that "While the Gulf's share of total global petroleum output has been somewhat reduced, the Middle East still produces 32.2 percent of the world total last year, amounting to 28.358 million barrels per day (bbl/d). The GCC members (excluding Bahrain) produced 23.9 percent of the world's total oil in 2013, amounting to 21.234 million bbl/d, while Iran's production amounted to another four percent of the global total."

Yemen of course sits on the strategic Bab al-Mandeb straits, through which millions of barrels of oil pass every day before reaching the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, on their way to Europe, while the Suez Canal itself remains Egypt's economic lifeline, and any disruption to the flow of shipping through the Bab al-Mandab straits would have disastrous consequences for both Europe and Egypt.

Cordesman explains that the US doesn't want to see a threat to the [straits] something that could affect the security of the Suez Canal, which means the security of the United States, a recognition that is likely take US support to the Saudi led military campaign to more than just logistical, help in targeting, or intelligence.

He says, "The strong ties between Yemen's Houthi Shi'ites and Iran pose another threat to both Saudi Arabia and the United States. It potentially could allow Iran to outflank the Gulf, and deploy air and naval forces to Yemen, threatening to put a stranglehold on Bab al-Mandab, a chokepoint, "The US does not want Iran to become a power which has any kind of serious influence in Yemen, particularly where you might see some form of Iranian naval and air presence."

But he warns there is more at stake and that "It is critical to note that far more is involved than energy: the cost and security of every cargo that goes through the Suez canal, the security of US and other allied combat ships moving through the canal, the economic stability of Egypt, and the security of Saudi Arabia's key port at Jeddah and major petroleum export facility outside the Gulf" all factor in how the US will develop its strategy in handling the explosive Yemeni crisis.

True enough, while Yemen does not match the strategic importance of the Gulf, it is of critical strategic importance to the stability of Saudi Arabia and the Arabian Peninsula, and therefore holds a critical spot in America's strategic calculus. And while now everyone is focused on the speedy control over the country by the ragtag Houthis, who were able to overwhelm the government forces of the US-supported Yemeni President Abd-Rabbo Hadi Mansour, first besieging him and putting him house arrest in Sanaa, and then after his escape to Aden, chasing out of the country altogether - some suggesting with US help. Yemen remains the base of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). From the US point of view, AQAP remains the most powerful terrorist threat to Saudi Arabia and the other Southern Gulf states, as well to the US, according to both the US State Department and National Counter Terrorism Center.

For now, US administration spokesmen like Jeff Rathke of the US State Department insist that US intelligence, logistical and target mapping support for the Saudi-led aerial bombardment of Yemen "is geared toward helping protect the borders of Saudi Arabia", and there is still hope for a diplomatic solution with Saudi Arabia refraining from escalating their military action. We have learned in the last three years how quickly conflict in that part of the world can escalate. The US might feel compelled to help Saudi Arabia in securing its border with Yemen and exert heavy pressure on Yemen's on Houthis as well as Iran, and the need to keep AQAP in check, but it should not rush its own forces through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea to the port of Aden on the pretext of protecting Bab al-Mandab and securing the shipping lines against a potential Iranian air or naval base.

Iran

While Iran has schemed to aid the Houthis (and perhaps empower them with the help of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh), and covets a foothold in the Arabian peninsula, I believe such potential disruption of the Bab al-Mandab chokepoint is not in Iran's interest nor would it risk such an adventure at a time when it is trying to get back into the good-graces of the West through the nuclear talks, which are about to conclude.

Yemen remains the base of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

After all, Iran has a much better chance of wrecking havoc in the West through the primary oil-shipping choke point where it sits atop the Straits of Hormuz, which remains the world's most important energy chokepoint. The Energy Information Administration (EIA) reported in November 2014 that an average of 17 million barrels of oil a day passed through the Straits of Hormuz.

The US should put into practice what it preaches, that there is no solution except one based on political reconciliation and accommodation. Yemen needs more aid, investment, and less weaponry and conflict: Since they merged in 1990, Yemen's two halves, the pro-Western north with its capital in Sanaa and the communist south, ruled from Aden - have been in a shaky union, that never addressed the old divisions among Sunni and Shiite sects or the rivalries that run deep among ancient tribes over very limited resources, most notably water.

As it aims to craft its strategy, the US and its allies must remember that with more than 26 million people, Yemen is the most populous country in the Arabian Peninsula. It is also the poorest of the 22 Arab nations. Per capita income is less than $7 a day, compared with $86 a day in neighbouring Saudi Arabia.

Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of al-Araby al-Jadeed, its editorial board or staff.