Raining bombs on Mozambique will not solve the growing jihadism problem

It was previously thought that military strikes on commanders will eliminate Mozambique´s jihadists, who now have links to ISIS as well as fingers in the lucrative heroin cargo landing from Pakistan and Iran.

This is no longer realistic. Insurgents in Mozambique have graduated to transnational narcotics smuggling with syndicates in Iran and Pakistan; kidnappings for ransom, and sharing specialist bomb-making skills with jihadists far up in Somalia.

A jihadist insurgency in Cabo Delgado province, which is a northern province of Mozambique, got underway in 2017, at first as a localised war.

But, the insurgency has already taken 3,000 lives and displaced nearly two million civilians.

''The scotched-earthy tactics of the Mozambique national army and Russia´s Wagner mercenaries in trying to eliminate the jihadists, are emboldening local resentment.''

The Mozambique jihadists call themselves Ansar Al Sunna and have established links with the feared ISIS terror group now restricted to parts of Iraq and Syria, according to a report from the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.

In February, multinational forces led by Rwanda´s army, which is reportedly funded by France, assassinated Mr. Tuahil Muhidim, the leader of the insurgency who had gained notoriety for beheadings.

His assassination was considered a breakthrough. Whilst this may be the case, hopes for peace are misguided for various reasons.

First, like ISIS and Al Qaeda, the insurgency in Mozambique is fast maturing into sophisticated trans-border, organised crime dealers attracting players from Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan.

Secondly, the local Muslim population where the insurgency is rife, are mired in deep poverty yet surrounded by lavish multi-billion-dollar gas rigs erected on their Indian Ocean coastline.

Finally, the scotched-earthy tactics of the Mozambique national army and Russia´s Wagner mercenaries in trying to eliminate the jihadists, are emboldening local resentment.

Globally, insurgencies begin as supposed ideological local fighters seeking justice for localised grievances. But as ISIS in Syria, Iraq; Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines, or Al-Shabab in Somalia proved, insurgencies quickly enmesh into lucrative organised crime pathways: kidnappings, narcotics, or money-laundering.

That is the point of inflection when a localised jihad insurgency goes global and forges alliances with players afar.

Mozambique´s insurgencies are no exception, as a frightening new investigation by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (CIATOC), reveals.

Cabo Delgado, in Mozambique, where the jihadists are running amok, remains an epicentre for the arrival and distribution of narcotics, mainly heroin and methamphetamines.

For a long time, heroin has been shipped to East Africa by vessels like Jelbut dhows (long-distance vessels), originating from the Makran coast of Pakistan and Iran. In more recent years, the favourite offloading place is now Cabo Delgado, Mozambique, where the jihadists are in combat. From 2020, heroin cargo from Afghanistan has also been seized in major operations in the region.

Southern Africa Jihad: The Cabo Delgado Insurgency
Overview on the context pre-ceding the violent trajectory of the insurgency in Mozambiquehttps://t.co/zAQH3Yw4lB pic.twitter.com/ZUtmYIF8er

— Jasmine Opperman (@Jasminechic00) October 17, 2020

So, the lure of narcotics profits is a devastating recruitment tool for Mozambique jihadists keen to replenish their ranks and leadership, each time a leadership assassination disrupts them.

Add to this toxic mix, the awful marginalisation of the majority Muslim population in northern Mozambique, all of which means that the insurgency will not die anytime soon.

The Muslim-majority Cabo Delgado province of Mozambique is so blighted by poverty that it is as if the Mozambique government wished to turn the region into rebellion.

Local youths feel deep resentment as thousands get parachuted to work on local gas installations where the likes of Total have wasted $20bn; ENI/Exxon Mobil $4,7bn.

This follows the discovery of $60bn-worth of natural gas in 2006 along Cabo Delgado´s Indian Ocean coastline, after which there was a stampede of energy companies including Eni (Italy), Total (France), ExxonMobil, Chevron, and BP.

To make matters worse, payments from lucrative gas deals have been corruptly snatched by senior politicians in Mozambique, leaving the local Muslim population grappling with environmental pollution and wealth-exclusion.

“The insurrection fed off huge local resentment against misgovernment and governmental corruption: Therefore the [local] population in [Cabo Delgado province], even if they did not actively support the jihadists, was reluctant to support the Mozambique government,” argues Dr. Stephen Chan, former British diplomat and now professor of African conflicts at the University of London.

Mozambique, which ranks a troubling 181 out 189 on the UN Human Development Index, is already one of the world´s poorest countries. This is a crying shame for a country with one of the richest gas finds in history.

If Mozambique´s jihadists have brought horror to the local population and waylaid gas drills, it is the reaction of the Mozambique army that has become almost criminal too.

''A more thoughtful approach, a hearts-and-minds campaign if you will, would be to win support from the Muslim population, which requires engaging with the religious leadership sensitively and respectfully.''

The Mozambique army reportedly carried out rapes, extra-judicial killings, and torture among the local population, and invited Russia´s Wagner mercenaries who repeated tactics borrowed from battlefields in Syria and Libya.

Only the 2021 arrival of France-backed Rwandan special commandos, who are some of Africa´s best trained, calmed the battlefield.

“It took a crack force of Rwandan soldiers to defeat the jihadists in a very brief period, and with minimum civilian damage,” adds Dr. Chan.

Predictably, it is Rwanda's commandos who assassinated the jihadists´ leader.

“The death of the jihadi leader is not itself a victory. It should instead be a moment for reflection as to how the insurrection began, and why the [Mozambique] government itself could not quell it,” warns Stephen Chan.

A more thoughtful approach, a hearts-and-minds campaign if you will, would be to win support from the Muslim population, which requires engaging with the religious leadership sensitively and respectfully.

International gas drillers have a key role to play too in helping end the grisly conflict. They should seriously consider the creation of a UN-administered fund that transparently re-invests some of the gas earnings into the local economy of Cabo Delgado. They should also use their financial leverage to make sure money actually goes directly to the local economy, rather than the coffers of Mozambique´s unaccountable central government. Building malls, factories, agricultural ranches, schools, hospitals and up-skilling local youths will ultimately diminish support for the Jihadists and ultimately serve as the key to unlocking peace.

Audrey Simango is an Africa diplomacy journalist and human rights activist. Her work is published in Newsweek, and The Africa Report. Her focus is the intersection of security between the Horn of Africa region and the Gulf Arab countries.

Follow her on Twitter: @audyawdiey

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