IS persists where states have diminished

In my most recent article for The New Arab, I argued that Iraqi PM Haider al-Abadi should step down due to his inability to protect Iraqi citizens and to inhibit the terrible degeneration into chaos the Iraqi state is witnessing. 

I argued that Abadi should step down, because even though criminals or terrorists such as IS are causing much of the violence in Iraq, it is the responsibility of the state to prevent crime.  In other words, one cannot blame criminals for a failing state (which Abadi often does), instead one must blame a failing state for the presence of criminals. 

This line of thinking should implicate other purposes of the state, thereby giving us an ability to "measure" the efficiency of Iraqi institutions - particularly in bringing together people of different religions, "sects," ethnicities and political persuasions.

The state as "institutions"

The term "institution" is often misunderstood, while the presence of institutions is often underestimated. Institutions are everywhere, the café, weddings, family dinners, the university and even on the subway. 

Institutions are not buildings, governments or banks; they are far more subtle and pervasive than that. Timur Kuran's explanation of institutions is most accessible, describing them as simply "socially generated rules that govern our behavior."

Formal mechanisms, such as electing presidents are institutions; while informal "manners," such as holding the door open for others or taking care not to turn the sole of your foot to others (a no-no in the Arab world) are examples of institutionalisation.

Culture is the meta-institution; from it we derive our norms and behavior and by so-doing we reinforce the normative prowess of culture (this also makes culture inherently conservative, though technology may change that).

Non-state flags essentially de-nationalised the operation and rendered it one of sectarian boasting and reprisal, rather than one of "liberation"

The Iraqi state, like all states, is an amalgam of institutions. The state regulates. The modern state has the particular function of exclusively regulating violence; this is what allows the free flow of trade, stability and the possession of property. 

The philosopher Hobbes, argued that such power should belong to the sovereign; Weber basically argued the modern sovereign is the modern state. Both classical Liberals and Socialist Democrats would accede to this function of the state. If the perpetuation of violence is carried out according to any other logic - if violence is prevalent outside the boundaries of the state, than the state can in many ways be said to not exist.

When it is argued that Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) are "inevitably" necessary to defeat terrorism in Iraq, a particular kind of incoherence is invoked. The PMUs are notorious for inflicting brutality on particular segments of the Iraqi population, usually affiliated with minority "sects".

This is not analogous to police brutality in the US, examples of which have recently reached unprecedented levels. In the case of the US, the state is failing to properly regulate a state agency (the police) and ensure equal justice.

In the case of Iraq, the very capacity of the state is diminished in the face of non-state violent actors. Non-state actors pursuing political aims through violence define terrorism; the PMUs are non-state actors, they fly flags other than that of Iraq and are bound to outside powers. The idea that the PMUs are necessary to combat terror is akin to saying we need terrorists to fight terrorists. 

Symbols of the state, symbols of politics

State symbols are very important, they speak to all citizens as an icon of national sovereignty; whether such sovereignty is fiction or fact, the people believe the state represents them. 

At political rallies across the country, symbols of sect, personal devotion and allegiance are far too common

When PMU forces took Fallujah this month, non-state flags were a prominent visible feature of the operation. The presence of non-state flags essentially de-nationalised the operation and rendered it one of sectarian boasting and reprisal, rather than one of "liberation" and effective state regulation. Iraqi society is pervaded by divisive, non-national symbols in the most destructive way these days.

At political rallies across the country, symbols of sect, personal devotion and allegiance are far too common; they overwhelm if not completely displace symbols of politics.  Politics is the distribution of resources and power. Some prefer strong central governments who distribute resources equally and other prefers weak governments with an autonomous economy, permitting the accumulation of concentrated wealth. 

Iraqi political consciousness is completely devoid of this understanding (at least in any measureable way). This type of political conversation isn't even happening in Iraq; rather the tension between who holds power to commit acts of political violence - and why - is still Iraq's political centerpiece, an indication of a critically weak state.   

In the days after the horrific Karrada bombing, PM Abadi's visit to the district was reportedly followed by Hadi al-Amri, an important leader of the Badr Organization. He reportedly appealed to the local population of Karrada to allow him to take revenge for the bombing. 

For Amri to call on terrorism to fight terrorism, signifies the diminished capacity of the Iraqi state

Notwithstanding the fact that Amri took up arms against Iraq in the Iraq-Iran war, that he is at the behest of Iran and is openly sectarian in his affiliations, it is humiliating to the office of the Prime Minister that anyone can make a public appeal to violence in the name of non-state actors. 

The office of the Prime Minister represents the "will of the people," but for Amri to call on terrorism to fight terrorism, signifies the diminished capacity of the Iraqi state.

Terrorism will continue

In the US, I am often asked about IS: "Do they represent Islam? Why are they so powerful?" My response is always the same: IS persists where states have diminished. IS is essentially the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) of the region; the KKK is an extremist white supremacist group prevalent in some parts of America and they superficially and tendentiously employ religious symbols of Christianity on behalf of "White Power."

IS employs incoherent and contradictory "symbols" of Islam in pursuit of power. I tell those who ask me, if the American military and police force was disbanded, how long do you think it would take for the KKK to take over parts of the US? The answer: Not long. 

Iraq and Syria no longer have functional military and police forces, the presence of terrorism is not only inevitable, it is structurally innate. Should Iraq continue to allow non-state actors to "fight" terrorism, then terrorism will continue to be a mainstay of Iraqi life.


Laith Saud is a writer and scholar. He is currently Visiting Assistant Professor of Religious Studies at DePaul University and co-author of An Introduction to Islam for the 21st Century (Wiley-Blackwell). Follow him on Twitter: @laithsaud