Morocco: Symbolic victories will not mask systemic problems forever

The Party for Justice and Development, (PJD) Morocco's first so-called formal "Islamist" political party has won another term in power. As the voting which got underway last Friday across the country shows, the party achieved 125 seats, a significant increase from 107 in the last parliamentary elections in 2011.

The growth in support for the party won't be entirely surprising to Morocco watchers, despite the party's weak record in achieving its manifesto promises. The PJD's leader Abdelillah Benkirane, the current Prime Minister of Morocco, is a popular figure among a class of Moroccans who have long viewed politics as governed by a closed elite disconnected from their reality and needs. 

From a modest background, the former teacher Benkirane has a colourful past. A former leading member of the revolutionary Islamic Youth movement (Chabiba Islamiya) in the 1970s and then a leading figurehead of one of the country's largest Islamic social movements - the Movement for Unicity and Reform (MUR), he likes to address his audience in the colloquial Moroccan dialect, Darija, and has a penchant for comical speeches which often liven up the country's stiff political debate.

His party's ascent to power has been a slow and negotiated process with the authorities, or the so-called "Makhzen", the name of the closed circle surrounding the monarch. It has changed and at times withheld fielding candidates under presumed pressure from the authorities and has consistently reiterated its unconditional support for the institution of the Monarchy.

This reflects a core philosophy of the Islamic social movement that Benkirane and many of his colleagues emerged from, the MUR, namely that conflict with the monarchy is undesirable and that all efforts for reform must be made in cooperation with the king.

91 percent believe nepotism, or "wasta", is critical to gaining employment

This of course has been a delicate balancing act for a party which came to power as the so-called "new opposition", replacing the largely discredited Leftist former opposition, the USFP. Despite entering government, the PJD has continued to present itself as the moderately rebellious child of Moroccan politics, refusing to abide by traditional protocols, whether consciously or through a lack of familiarity with the structures of power and positioning itself as the voice of the forgotten, the vulnerable and the disillusioned.

This niche has proven fruitful for the party in a country where political disillusionment runs high. A recent poll shows 82 percent of Moroccans think that the state is corrupt and 91 percent believe nepotism, or "wasta", is critical to gaining employment.

In fact the second party in the recent elections, the PAM, often referred to as the "king's party", despite the fact the monarch is meant to be above politics, had its founder singled out as a symbol of corruption by the Moroccan variant of the Arab spring movement, the so-called "February 20th movement".

Turn out figures for voting tell their own story, with a downward trend among voters which began in the 1970s, and reached a record low of just 37 percent in 2007. Following that, the Moroccan government began a nationwide campaign to encourage voting, not least to satisfy external observers that Moroccans do actually believe the country's parliamentary system is worth casting their ballot for.

For the PJD this has meant a delicate dance with the monarch and his inner circle over some of the change it promised to bring about

In a world of democracy promotion objectives, as set by the US and other European partners, voter turnout can be used as an indicator of a country's democratic progress - and be determinant of funding. Even in semi-authoritarian settings, such as Morocco, where all major decisions, from foreign policy to infrastructure remain in the king's hands, the kingdom has an interest in showing to the world that Moroccans do believe change can occur through the ballot.

On this occasion, it seems only 43 per cent felt that to be true.

The reality is that while the parliament can and does debate and vote on a range of issues, none can be acted upon without the royal stamp of approval. Rather than thinking of Morocco's parliament in the conventional sense of the term, it is perhaps more helpful to think of it as a debating chamber where grievances can be aired and solutions discussed, but the ultimate power to act resides strictly with the king.

For the PJD this has meant a delicate dance with the monarch and his inner circle over some of the change it promised to bring about in its manifesto, and accusations of subversion by his critics. In Morocco, the king is beyond critique and so comments by Benkirane referring to a problem of "tahakoum" or authoritarianism in the country were received rather coldly by the Palace.

So how to explain the party's continuing popularity despite its inability to deliver on its political promises?

In brief, both the low voter turnout as well as the popularity of a party unable to meet its electoral promises are a sign that Moroccans are well aware of the limits of their parliamentary system.

Moroccans are well aware of the limits of their parliamentary system

Morocco has been plagued by some of the same social and economic problems for generations. High unemployment at 10 percent, particularly among the young, has been an ongoing issue. On any given week in Rabat, the country's political capital, students can be found protesting outside the parliament for jobs. They alternate with government workers, trade unions and others keen to make their permanent state of frustration with a lack of employment opportunities heard.

Benkirane has promised some progress on this issue, but has been unable to deliver. He also promised a rate of growth of 7 percent, but ended his term with a rate of 1.3 percent. The party has also brought in hugely unpopular austerity measures and despite running on an anti-corruption platform, has had very little success in implementing it.

The issues which brought Moroccans to the street in 2011 remain unresolved and some analysts speculate that the emergence of an "Islamist" political party at that time, alongside very limited constitutional reforms was an attempt to diffuse that tension.

The frustrations of the street are also being channeled outside of formal politics

But the reality for most Moroccans hasn't changed, and so while all eyes are on the formal political setting and its soap-opera like dramas, the frustrations of the street are also being channeled outside of formal politics. One example are the pacifist but revolutionary Islamic movements such as the Sufi-inspired Al Adl wa al Ihsan. This group has a large following and wants an Islamic Republic.

But also, and potentially and more precariously for the regime, these frustrations are being channeled by more extreme groups, whose attacks the government has so far been remarkably successful at thwarting.

The success of the PJD has ridden on its reputation for professionalism, honesty and approachability. For the conservative middle class which tends to vote for the party in the country's big cities, it represents the emergence of politicians who sound and look familiar and whose access to power is seen as a potential opening of the country's wealth, power and opportunity for the next generation.

This means that regardless of its political record, the mere existence of figures such as Benkirane is seen as a form of social progress. But there is only so long symbolic victories can last, and as the systemic problems facing the country persist unaddressed, the figure will eventually be pointed.

The king has always been above the fray and is generally popular, seen as a unifying figure among Moroccans. And while the PJD is not without its critics, it is only a matter of time before the facade of democracy can mask popular desire for more accountable, more transparent and fairer government.

Myriam Francois is a journalist and Research Associate at the SOAS Centre for Islamic Studies. She is also a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Global Policy (CGP) think tank.

Follow her: @MFrancoisCerrah

Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author, and do not necessarily represent those of The New Arab, its editorial board or staff.