Failing states: The cases of Lebanon and Libya

Ceasefire opportunities continue to be unexploited in Libya with the persistence of the country's divisions.

For more than a year, Libya has been split between two parliaments, an internationally recognised one that followed on from elections in August 2014, and the General National Council (GNC), which refuses to recognise the legitimacy of those elections.

But whereas Libya appears to be a clear case of the failure of transition from an authoritarian ruler to a modern state, other forms of failure can be located in less violent examples that exhibit a similar degree of state breakdown.

The case of Lebanon offers such an example. The recent absence of violent confrontations has not been sufficient to initiate modern statecraft. Instead, the state is held back by a political stalemate and a lack of seriousness among the nation's political players that continues to hinder all attempts at develeopment.

Importantly, the Libyan crisis is primarily related to an extreme form of polarisation, with regional support on both sides

The Libyan situation, though different in many ways, may offer insight as to how frayed the state in Lebanon has become.

Political polarisation and conflict

The elected House of Representatives in Libya voted to extend its mandate before the end of its term this month.

This means that now both of the vying representative bodies have become less democratic, taking away the advantage of legitimacy the House of Representatives had acquired through elections.

Under the current conditions, the political vacuum in Libya continues to expand, with increased fragmentation as the Islamic State group's control of areas in Southern Libya remains unchallenged.

This is coupled with the increasing ambitions of General Khalifa Haftar to arrogate political power to himself while pursuing Operation Dignity, while Libya Dawn forces persist in their refusal to engage in talks over a national unity government.

Importantly, the Libyan crisis is primarily related to an extreme form of polarisation, with regional support on both sides. The political scene in Libya, therefore, depicts the larger regional conflict on a smaller scale, manifesting a divide between Islamist groups represented by various factions in the Libya Dawn forces, and a more secular alternative advocated by General Haftar and the House of Representatives.

This polarisation has exploited the absence of state security, thus developing into a civil war. But whereas state failure in Libya is tied to the relatively balanced presence of forces, aggravated by each sode endorsing exclusionary projects, the Lebanese state retains some degree of unity - though possibly only in appearance.

This semblance of unity has allowed a degree of stability to permeate the country, and for security threats to be staved off - at least temporarily.

Yet political disagreements have plagued the Lebanese government since its establishment, and one can identify a similar form of polarisation, marked by the specificity of Lebanese politics, that has caused a deadlock across all state institutions.

Though the two cases appear to be significantly different, the Lebanese state shares more than might appear with its Libyan counterpart.

Lebanon - the persistence of a failed state

The Lebanese scene exhibits a different set of symptoms of malaise. Protests in Lebanon persist with a continued crackdown by the security forces. But the strict façade of the internal security forces hides beneath it a fragile and idle state.

As in Libya, we have a representative body that has decided to give itself the authority to persist in a position of power under conditions of extreme polarisation, while being unable to meet the righteous demands of its citizens.

The Lebanese situation is much closer to the Libyan case than we might think.

Though the presence of security appears to be the major difference between the two cases, such stability is not the product of the state's efficient apparatus. Instead, stability is the mere product of a regional and international consensus.

The state, independent of support, is incapable of achieving its purpose of drawing from the social body an executive power that has sufficient unity to be effective. This has been most clearly exposed with the enduring refuse crisis, among other failures pertaining to citizens' everyday needs.

Accordingly, the Libyan crisis can tell us quite a lot about the political situation in Lebanon.

We can see that the present political rhetoric masks a destructive model of conflict and dissent that merely awaits the opportunity to surface. We can also identify a ruling class that would not hesitate to lead the country down the path of civil war in exchange for maximising its own power.

But perhaps the uniqueness of the Lebanese model lies in providing us with an example of a failed state that persists in power uninhibited, as long as it is cunning enough to use social divisions for its advantage.

The state has shielded itself with a 25-year-old agreement that marked the end of the civil war, an agreement whose death has long passed, but which is yet to be pronounced.

Karim Barakat is an instructor of philosophy in the American University of Beirut. 

Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of al-Araby al-Jadeed, its editorial board or staff.