An Arab Spring in Bangladesh?

In recent weeks, the Bangladeshi government has cracked down violently on students demanding equitable access to coveted government jobs amid an unemployment crisis.

To contain the protests, authorities have shut down all educational institutions, imposed a strict curfew, and cut off internet access.

Thousands of police officers and paramilitaries have been patrolling the streets, and more than 170 people have died.

Such unrest in one of Asia’s most populous and promising emerging economies, which has made remarkable progress on development and political stability in the half-century or so since it gained independence, did not come out of nowhere.

Bangladesh’s youth uprising, with its echoes of the Arab Spring, illustrates how corruption, cronyism, and inequality tend to accompany GDP growth, especially under an increasingly authoritarian regime.

Since taking power in 2009, Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League has largely failed to deliver on promises of job creation.

To be sure, Bangladesh’s public-sector workforce has expanded over the past two decades, and civil servants have received steady raises and improved benefits.

But access to these jobs is now a matter of politics. The implicit social contract, whereby the youth population remains compliant as long as the government provides jobs and keeps the cost of living down, has been broken.

Bangladesh needs to absorb millions of unemployed and underemployed young people into the labour market. Currently, more than one-third of university graduates remain unemployed within a year or two of graduation.

Worse, roughly 40% of Bangladeshi youth – twice the global average – are not in education, employment, or training. Unfortunately, private-sector employment has remained stagnant, and wage growth across the economy has slowed, fueling demand for lucrative public-service jobs.

The real problem, however, is the government’s job-quota system. Introduced in 1972, this system has gone through several changes.

In 1997, Hasina’s government, then in its first term, began reserving spots for the children of freedom fighters in the 1971 War of Independence; in 2010, this privilege was extended to their grandchildren.

By 2018, 30% of these jobs were reserved for the families of freedom fighters, with an additional 10% for women, 10% for disadvantaged districts, 5% for ethnic minorities, and 1% for disabled people. That same year, following mass student protests, the government scrapped the quotas altogether.

But, in June, the High Court reinstated the controversial job-quota system, sparking widespread protests. On July 1, demonstrations began at the University of Dhaka, before spreading across the country. Student protesters demanded reform of the 30% quota provision for descendants of freedom fighters, which has been primarily used to reward loyalists of the Awami League.

Thousands of these “war heroes” have forged certificates, while some 11,000 people, including mayors, lawmakers, senior civil servants, and their close associates, were added to the official list of freedom fighters in recent years.

Young women were a driving force behind the protests, despite the ruling party’s violent response.

This reflects the simmering economic frustration of Bangladeshi girls and women, who have made significant educational gains in recent decades but are still limited in their employment opportunities.

Female labour force participation in urban areas fell from 34.5% in 2010 to 31% in 2016 and 2017.

The latest data from the World Bank confirm that conditions are worsening: urban women face higher unemployment rates (9.6%) compared to their male counterparts (3.8%), while young women aged 15-24 experience the highest unemployment rate at 16.5%, double that of men in the same age group.

Even the proportion of women workers in the ready-made garment export sector has declined.

On July 21, the Supreme Court hurriedly overturned the lower court’s decision, ruling that 93% of government jobs must be awarded on merit.

Despite scaling back the quota system and bringing an apparent calm to the country, the court ruling does little to address the deep-rooted cronyism that have come to characterise the Awami League’s rule.

State institutions, including the judiciary, have been weakened, the government’s capacity for implementing critical reforms has been reduced, and the economy seems increasingly fragile.

The rising cost of living and rampant corruption by Public Service Commission officials responsible for civil-servant recruitment have further added to the society-wide discontent.

Despite being temporarily quelled, the youth protests could still expand into a wider anti-government movement. The video footage of police officers killing an unarmed student in broad daylight has traumatised the country and undermined trust in law enforcement – seen by many as beneficiaries of the quota system. Yet, no public apology has been offered for security forces’ abuses.

Moreover, the lack of a genuine popular mandate – Hasina was re-elected for a fourth consecutive term in January in a farcical election boycotted by most of Bangladesh’s opposition parties – has forced her to tighten her grip on society.

And few within the ruling party’s cabinet can act as honest brokers to rebuild trust and repair relationships with protesters. Some believe that, by resorting to brutal repression, the government may have exhausted its options to remain in power.

All of this suggests that the current protest movement could become a critical turning point for Bangladesh, precipitating a return to electoral democracy. This would help the country’s cause as it prepares to graduate from “least developed country” status in 2026.

However, as the 2011 Arab Spring showed, mass uprisings against authoritarian leaders are not always successful, and failed revolutions can lead to more repression and political unrest.

A destabilised Bangladesh may have several important regional implications: it could complicate ongoing efforts to settle the Rohingya humanitarian crisis in Myanmar, push Bangladesh closer to China, and hinder India’s trade with its landlocked northeast states.

Bangladesh has a rich history of youth protests, which played a crucial role in laying the foundation for the country’s independence in 1971. The current round of mass demonstrations shows that young Bangladeshis could, once again, help the country chart a democratic course and achieve sustainable economic growth.

M. Niaz Asadullah, Head of the Southeast Asia cluster of the Global Labor Organization, is a visiting professor of economics at the University of Reading and a professorial fellow at North South University in Bangladesh.

This piece was first published on www.project-syndicate.org

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Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of The New Arab, its editorial board or staff.