Sons of Syria: From Vienna to Riyadh

The ambitious and suddenly quite exciting Vienna process is reshaping the political narrative of the Syrian conflict at high speed.

Following the November summit and the roadmap to talks, transition governments and UN-supervised elections, activity amongst Syria's opposition groups has reached an unprecedented level.

In Riyadh this month, some 65 political and armed groups spent two days hammering out a basic political vision and approach to the upcoming talks scheduled to start in the new year. According to the Free Syrian Army (FSA) Southern Front, the groups represented forces on the ground "ten times stronger than other groups".

This moment offers the potential "distillation" of the Syrian opposition into a more coherent form.

For the duration of the conflict, the Syrian opposition has been characterised by a bewildering array of actors operating in fluctuating and changing coalitions, alliances and umbrella groups.

At one point the BBC estimated there were 1,000 armed groups with a force of 100,000 fighters, but accurate metrics have been hard to qualify.

The West's obsession with trying to distinguish "moderate" from "extremist" groups, as well as the disconnect between political opposition outside the country and armed opposition within it have sown confusion that has been exacerbated by the sheer number of foreign sponsors and their ever-evolving priorities.

The more strategically inclusive Vienna process is looking to... act almost like a 'Sorting Hat' to establish which opposition groups are acceptable

The more strategically inclusive Vienna process is looking to use the international and regional actors involved in the conflict to act almost like a "Sorting Hat" to establish which opposition groups are acceptable or not.

At the far end of the scale lies the Islamic State group, which is entirely rejected, and not far behind them is the al-Qaeda-affiliated Nusra Front.

But then things get a bit more confusing, with groups like Ahrar al-Sham - whose links to Nusra are being tested by the new lines on what constitutes acceptable opposition.

The agreement reached in Riyadh appears to have got enough players on board for the process to kick off. The issue of Assad's future remains ambiguous beyond almost all sides talking about different lengths of transition.

The biggest absentees from Riyadh - apart from the Nusra/IS rejectionists - were the Kurdish PYD/YPG and the Syrian Democratic Forces, who subsequently claimed their own coalition - although what they will do under its banner remains hard to predict.

Once the "acceptable" opposition make initial forays into talks in the New Year, there is a window of opportunity in which to grasp a bid for consolidation, and for others to support greater coherence.

Firstly, Russia may struggle to justify bombing groups who it has accepted into a diplomatic process that it has endorsed - although this will need to be tried and tested and cannot be presumed.

More creatively minded, and considering how initially successful the US-designed but Iraqi-led "Sons of Iraq" programme was when it came to reducing violence, could an adapted programme find a place for itself in Syria?

Frederick Hartmann's famous principle of a "conservation of enemies", saw successful powers avoid making, or simultaneously engaging with, more enemies than absolutely necessary. Such a policy provided relatively improved security in which political reconciliation could take place.

A potential "Sons of Syria" programme, combined with more devolved and regional power as part of the constitutional review could address the IS dilemma as far as the opposition is concerned.

The Syrian opposition has found itself for too long at the mercy of the regime, as well as competing and changing priorities among its supporters.

The Syrian opposition has found itself for too long at the mercy of the regime

It was Nelson Mandela who famously wrote that "a freedom fighter learns the hard way that it is the oppressor who defines the nature of the struggle, and the oppressed is often left no recourse but to use methods that mirror those of the oppressor".

Fighting against the regime and then being outflanked by IS and Nusra, the former emerging partly as a collapse of the Sons of Iraq programme to the east, has continually hamstrung the opposition to date.

Whereas, in retrospect, the Geneva process acted as a trap for the opposition that was exploited by the regime, the Vienna process is ultimately owned by those outside of Syria - which places the dynamic between the opposition and the regime in a different balance.

A "Sons of Syria" programme that looks to operationalise the principle the opposition groups agreed to in Riyadh - in particular the commitment to a "democratic mechanism through a pluralistic regime that represents all sectors of the Syrian people" - could be an important component of a successful process at large.

It could channel external support, unify a divided opposition and place this more coherent voice into the critical discussions ahead of the formulation of a new Syrian constitution and legitimate elections.

James Denselow is an author and writer on Middle East politics and security issues. He is a former board member of the Council for Arab-British Understanding (CAABU) and a director of the New Diplomacy Platform. Follow him on Twitter: @jamesdenselow

Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of al-Araby al-Jadeed, its editorial board or staff.