Rainfall washes away the excuse of Egypt's government

Last week, parts of Alexandria looked like New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina.

People were stranded in homes. Cars were partially submerged. The city came to a standstill and seemed utterly unequipped to deal with what was - relative to the country's generally mild weather conditions - severe weather.  

However, the winds were not strong enough to take down houses, and the rain wasn't actually heavy enough to justify the havoc it incurred. Alexandria's weather conditions were not fierce enough to be granted a proper pronoun, such as Katrina or Isabel. But they did inspire one glaring headline: "Profound institutional failure."

The simple answer is that everyone is to blame

Alexandria's governor, Hany El-Messiry, lost his job as a result.

El-Messiry had warned of impending major environmental catastrophe due to rainfall as a result of the city’s inadequate sewage system, which had also resulted in flooding and a general standstill nearly a month earlier.

Having spent over ten months on the job, there was probably room for improvement during his tenure. This must not detract from the fact that El-Messiry, like many of his contemporaries, had inherited a defunct system of local civil administration that essentially leaves the entire country prone to catastrophic effects whenever it faces stress tests such as heavy rainfall.

Alexandrians organising a demonstration to protest against the governorate's handling of the rainfall directed their anger towards local authorities - who they accuse of being complicit in the negligence associated with the chaotic response to the flooding.

The sentiment stems from a feeling that local and municipal authorities that usually outlive their superiors such as governors or ministers must bear the burden of local administration, which includes organising aspects of civil defence and providing services that enhance public security and smooth city administration.

These protesters are correct in assuming that El-Messiry's underlings were at least just as complicit as he was. Local city administrators in Egypt are notorious for being some of the main sources of corruption in Egypt.

The institutions they operate under, on the other hand, had been utterly ruined by a system of governance in Egypt that became more and more centralised, crippling the ability of local authorities to exact change - and creating confusion as to who exactly was responsible and how they were meant to be held accountable anyway.

The simple answer is that everyone is to blame.

The seemingly simple solution is that the Egyptian system of governance needs a top-down institutional overhaul that clearly defines responsibility, but also creates measurable standards on how to identify the shortcomings in infrastructure, safety procedures, crisis management - and how to systematically deal with them.

Implementing this "simple" solution requires a very complicated process of dismantling and reassembling the entire system. It has been so thoroughly entangled that a solution can no longer hinge on fixing some small glitches or firing some key figures, but something much more profound than that.

In a press conference in early October held with El-Messiry and the head of Alexandria Sewage Company, as well as other local authorities, El-Messiry seemed to be pleading with the head of the sewage company to provide him with an estimate of the cost and scope of work needed to fix the city’s sewage system - since most rainfall tended to disturb traffic and create minor flooding.

El-Messiry was met with tepid platitudes such as "we are doing our best with what we have", and "we promise next time it will be better". It wasn't.

Whether he tried hard enough or not, El-Messiry was simply unable to use the tools that were theoretically at his disposal to try and keep the city safe.

It is a common trend. The result is a constantly vulnerable population.

Every year, hundreds if not thousands die seemingly avoidable deaths in Egypt. There is a cycle of constant catastrophes that result from poor infrastructure, chronic safety oversight or an absence of regulatory implementation.

Traffic-related deaths and collapsed buildings represent two of the most jarring causes. While traffic accidents will occur in any context, in Egypt, the poor state of the road and lack of stern regulation of driving definitely augment the dangers on the road.

In 2012, a train smashed into a packed school bus, killing more than 50 students. One of the tragedies of this episode was that it seemed as if the accident could have been avoided if the railroad authorities had thought to introduce modern-day signaling systems for railway crossings.

The major crime of the Mubarak administration over 30 years of rule was allowing the state to reach such a level of internal weakness

The general state of Egyptian roads and poor implementation of traffic laws help explain the staggering annual traffic death tolls reaching nearly 12,000 a year.

Similarly, around 65,000 buildings have been declared condemned for more than a year, yet they still house hundreds of thousands of families. If Egypt suffers an episode similar to the 1992 earthquake, the results would be unimaginably horrific.

The major crime of the Mubarak administration over 30 years of rule was allowing the state to reach such a level of internal weakness and disintegration.

Of the many explanations behind the participation of millions in the 25 January revolution is the basic fact that government has not been working. Along with corruption - in all its forms - one of the other points of clarification must be how to delineate the role of local authorities and the role of the central authorities, including the responsibility of cabinet ministers and security authorities.

With police officials and army generals often being appointed to roles of local administration, these roles are often unclear.

Egyptian authorities, from the presidency to municipal councils, must realise that a top-down overhaul of some government institutions is necessary to change the pattern of incompetence and failure in the face of difficult tests.

Sure, personnel could and should be reshuffled, but the priority should be in fundamentally changing how things work.


Mohamed ElMeshad is a journalist and a PhD candidate at SOAS, focused on the political economy of the media. He extensively worked in Egypt, Bahrain, West Africa, the UK and US. Recently, he contributed to the Committee to Protect Journalists’ book, Attacks on the Press (2015).

Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of al-Araby al-Jadeed, its editorial board or staff.