The Russian invasion of Ukraine has thrust neutral nations into a security crisis, leaving them with a choice between traditional neutrality and military alliances.
Finland and Sweden, two Nordic countries, decided to join the NATO alliance and applied for membership on 15 May.
But while most NATO members welcomed the applicants, Turkey has prevented them from joining.
Ankara blocked an early fast-track request and has said it will veto Finland and Sweden’s membership applications. NATO has 30 members and new membership must be agreed unanimously.
Turkey has accused Sweden and Finland of politically and financially supporting Kurdish groups opposed to the Turkish government, claiming that Sweden is a "hatchery" for terrorist organisations and is harbouring members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).
Ankara also claims that Sweden will provide $376 million to support Kurdish militants in Syria in 2023 and that it has provided military equipment to them, including anti-tank weapons and drones.
Another bone of contention is the restriction of arms exports imposed by Finland and Sweden, and other EU states, against Ankara following its incursion into Syria in 2019.
“It is indeed a negotiable position and in the first stage reflects Turkey’s annoyance with them, as Sweden and Finland have sheltered several members of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) terrorist organisation,” Valeria Giannotta, the Scientific Director of CeSPI Observatory on Turkey, told The New Arab.
The PKK has Marxist-Leninist roots and launched an armed struggle against the Turkish government in 1984 to establish an independent Kurdish state within the country. The conflict is estimated to have killed around 40,000 people since then.
The group is recognised by the European Union (EU) and the US as a terrorist group, and even Sweden in 1984 described it as a terrorist organisation, as well as Finland.
Meanwhile, Turkey views the YPG, a key Western-backed component of the fight against the Islamic State group in Syria, as the PKK's offshoot.
Stockholm has rejected Turkey’s claims, saying that it is a major humanitarian donor to Syria but that all aid coordination goes through the UN or international organisations and is for civilian populations, not political or military structures.
Turkey meanwhile has called for “concrete steps” before Ankara could support Finland and Sweden’s membership, including halting aid to the PKK and its affiliated groups and the extradition of 28 people from Sweden and 12 from Finland to Turkey, all ‘terrorism’ suspects.
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Turkey's undeclared goals
Despite Turkey’s rhetoric, some argue that Ankara will ultimately greenlight Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO and is only seeking concessions from the West.
Emily Milliken, Senior Vice President and Lead Analyst at Askari Associates, LLC, believes that blocking Sweden and Finland's membership in NATO is not the driving factor.
Instead, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is using the opportunity to flex his diplomatic muscles and garner favour at home ahead of difficult elections next year.
“Recognising he’s weakened by the ongoing economic crisis and other geopolitical factors, Erdogan knows he can get the nationalist vote by taking a stance against Finland and Sweden and their alleged support for Kurdish groups like the PKK that are seen as enemies of Turkey,” Milliken told The New Arab.
“This is not a new play; he’s done this in past elections. In just one example, ahead of the 2018 election, he launched an anti-PKK operation in northern Iraq,” she added.
Ankara also intends to force Western countries to make other concessions that it has long been waiting for. For example, there are 3.7 million Syrian refugees in Turkey and with its dire economic situation it would certainly be happy to receive help from the EU.
In addition, Ankara would want to see the lifting of an EU arms embargo over Turkey's invasion of northern Syria in 2019 and a return to the F-35 fighter jet program, which was scrapped by the US after it bought S-400s from Russia.
Turkey also seeks to accelerate the sale of F-16 fighter jets and garner Washington's support for Turkey's re-invasion of northern Syria, which could include the construction of a ‘safe zone’ for Syrian refugees.
“Turkey has so far made three military incursions into Syria, and all targeted the YPG. Now it seems to be preparing for the fourth one, again against the YPG,” Birol Baskan, a non-resident scholar at the Middle East Institute, told TNA.
“Yet, the US should give permission for that. Turkey is most likely using the NATO card to get some concessions from the US on the YPG.”
Biden's approval is crucial for Erdogan because he needs US support to operate in Syria and Iraq, and to advance Turkey's role as a mediator between Ukraine and Russia. A key issue might also be Erdogan’s disappointment at being unable to establish the same type of rapport with Joe Biden as he had with Donald Trump.
Erdogan complained to reporters last month that he and Biden didn't have the kind of relationship he had with former US presidents Trump and Barack Obama. "Of course, there are some meetings from time to time, but they should've been more advanced," he said. "My wish is that we can achieve this in the following process."
Another goal of Turkey is to balance Russia and the West in the Ukraine war. Ankara has taken a moderate stance on the conflict, not supporting Western sanctions against Russia, while continuing to export drones to Ukraine.
With the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO, this balance could be upset, and it is better for Turkey to resist to some extent to placate Moscow and the geopolitical threats it could feel from such a move.
“In a particular time of crisis due to the Russia-Ukraine war, Turkey questions the unity of the alliance and whether extending the membership would be convenient due to inevitable reactions by Moscow,” said Giannotta, adding that Ankara is also seeking to continue attracting Russian tourists this summer.
Turkey also needs Russian guarantees in Syria, in particular for maintaining the security corridor along its borders.
Ankara overplaying its hand?
However, Turkey's insistence on blocking the membership process of Finland and Sweden may be to Ankara's detriment.
The two countries' accession to NATO is crucial for the West as it pushes NATO eastward, and with Finland's membership, Russia's common border with NATO will double to 1,300 km (810-mile).
If Turkey continues its stubborn stance against Finland and Sweden, it may lose the international prestige it gained from the export of Bayraktar TB2 drones to Ukraine.
Ankara is also weakening its position in Washington and across NATO by hindering the expansion of the alliance. In retaliation, the US could increase military aid to Greece, and “it could be induced to rethink the sale of the most advanced model of F16 jets to Ankara,” Giannotta said.
Turkey knows that it must choose the middle ground in this process and use it for more concessions instead of blocking the membership of Sweden and Finland.
Erdogan even knows that expelling dissident Kurds from Sweden and Finland and extraditing them may be impossible, and he could use other options instead.
“I highly doubt though that Finland and Sweden will agree to expel Kurdish groups. Expelling Kurdish groups is a decision, I presume, only the courts can take, not the governments,” said Baskan.
“I also doubt that they will even restrict the PKK’s public activities, which do not pose any direct and immediate security risk to any of their citizens. Sweden can help Turkey so that its weapons will not go into the hands of the PKK. I cannot think of any other guarantee.”
As a NATO member, Turkey has always supported its ‘open door’ policies. Now, it appears to be blocking NATO’s expansion.
It is clear that this is a political manoeuvre to hold the accession process hostage in order to extract domestic and foreign policy goals.
But by taking advantage of the process like this, Ankara might be overplaying its hand.
Dr Mohammad Salami holds a PhD in International Relations. He is a specialist in Middle Eastern policy, particularly in Syria, Iran, Yemen, and the Persian Gulf region. His areas of expertise include politics and governance, security, and counterterrorism.
Follow him on Twitter: @moh_salami