With Gaza facing unprecedented devastation, experts and analysts have cast doubt on Hamas's ability to maintain its traditional internal regulations for selecting a new leader following Israel’s killing of Yahya Sinwar.
The movement, typically reliant on elections and Shura Council processes from the grassroots to the top leadership, is now likely to pursue a different path through consensus and understanding between its various organisational levels to choose a new head of its political bureau and other key positions.
This significant departure from established protocols comes amid extraordinary circumstances that make traditional electoral processes virtually impossible.
The Israeli military’s control over the Gaza Strip, coupled with the mounting risks facing Hamas leaders in host countries such as Lebanon, Iran, Qatar, and others, has created an unprecedented challenge for the organisation's selection process.
The situation has been further complicated by Israel's systematic targeting of Hamas's leadership structure. Last Thursday's announcement of Yahya Sinwar's death marked another significant blow to the organisation's command structure.
Sinwar's leadership had begun following the assassination of former chief Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran on 31 July, while Deputy Political Bureau Chief Saleh Al-Arouri was killed on 2 January. Israel had previously announced the killing of Al-Qassam Brigades commander Mohammed Deif and several military council members, along with numerous brigade leaders across Gaza.
Esmat Mansour, a Palestinian ex-prisoner currently in Gaza who shared time with Sinwar in various Israeli prisons, including Ashkelon, Hadarim, and Beer Sheva, offered The New Arab unique insights into the fallen leader's character.
"While his ideas about resistance and jihad were indeed extreme and rigid," Mansour told TNA, "Sinwar was not suicidal. He was rational and pragmatic, believing in long-term truces and political arrangements".
According to Mansour, the scale of Israel's response to Hamas’s 7 October attack caught Sinwar off guard. "He never anticipated Israel's completely destructive response," Mansour explains.
"Neither did he expect the [Hamas] military operation to succeed in breaching Gaza-Israel borders or the sudden collapse of Israel's security system. The chaos that followed, with smaller armed groups and civilians participating, appeared to be beyond the scope of the original planning."
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The current crisis represents what many consider Hamas's most painful moment, yet Professor Sami Al-Astal, an academic and researcher of Islamic movements, maintains that rebuilding the organisation isn't impossible.
"Hamas has weathered significant blows in past decades, including the assassination of its founder Sheikh Ahmed Yassin in 2004 and the killing of Gaza's Hamas leader Abdul Aziz Rantisi just a month later," he says.
The political landscape facing Hamas's next leadership appears increasingly complex. Khalil Al-Hayya and Khaled Meshaal have emerged as potential candidates for the top political position, though Al-Astal suggests that any new leadership must consider the dramatic changes in Gaza's demographic landscape and Hamas's political topography.
Significantly, he points to another possible option. "Forming a committee rather than appointing a single person to lead the movement is among its options under these compelling circumstances, especially if there are difficulties in smoothly and easily selecting a unanimously agreed-upon individual," he says.
"Hamas cannot fully adhere to its basic system and established regulations," Al-Astal continues. "The radical changes in Gaza's demographic makeup and Hamas's political landscape have affected the organisation's structure and leadership levels at second and third tiers and beyond, reflecting the current state of devastation and destruction."
Political analyst Iyad Al-Qurra emphasises Hamas's resilience and institutional structure. "The movement has political offices, consultative councils, and a military wing, each operating within an institutional framework," he explains.
He points to Khalil Al-Hayya's position as Sinwar's deputy in Gaza's political bureau, noting his "personal and militant credentials, special relationships with former political bureau chiefs Haniyeh and Sinwar, and deep understanding of Hamas's internal and external dynamics".
The impact of Israel’s war, however, extends beyond military casualties to create what Al-Astal describes as "a gulf between Hamas's organisational levels and the Palestinian public in Gaza". He notes that the population "wants to stop the death, restore life and hope, and rebuild their educational, health, and economic infrastructure".
This public sentiment, combined with broader regional dynamics, may force Hamas's new leadership to reconsider its strategic approach. "Hamas recognises the world's strongest nations' support for Israel and their abandonment of Palestinians," Al-Astal observes.
"The exposure of the Iranian axis and its severe blows from assassinations of Hezbollah leaders and Iranian officials in the region compel the movement to consider these developments in choosing its new leadership and policies."
Despite devastating losses in Gaza over more than a year of war, affecting both its organisational and governmental apparatus through casualties and the destruction of facilities, Hamas maintains some governance capacity, albeit extremely limited.
The movement continues to sporadically pay portions of its government employees' salaries, contributes to aid distribution efforts, and maintains some police presence through plainclothes officers.
Al-Qurra dismisses concerns about organisational instability following Sinwar's death.
"The absence of one person has not affected and will not affect adaptation, decision-making, negotiation management, and Hamas's external relations," he argues. He expects continuity in Hamas's positions regarding prisoner exchange terms, following the mechanisms previously established by Sinwar and agreed upon within Hamas.
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"Al-Hayya now leads the political file related to prisoner exchange negotiations," Al-Qurra notes, "and the military system operates in its own special way, having naturally adapted over a full year to face challenges. Sinwar's absence won't impact the resistance."
He emphasises that "the negotiation file won't change, and the file of Israeli prisoners and soldiers and preserving their lives isn't subject to who will head Hamas, as it's managed differently".
As Hamas navigates this critical transition period, the movement faces the challenge of balancing its ideological commitments with the practical needs of Gaza's devastated population.
The selection of a new leadership may well signal the future direction Hamas chooses; somewhere between maintaining its historical stance of resistance and adopting a more pragmatic approach to ensure the survival and reconstruction of Gaza.
This article is published in collaboration with Egab