Turkey and Iraq signed more than 20 agreements during Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's first visit to the neighbouring country in more than a decade.
In statements after the visit, attention focused on the ambitious Development Road project, a highway and railway corridor stretching 1,200 kilometres (745 miles) from the Persian Gulf city of Basra to the Turkish port of Mersin.
Dubbed the 'new Silk Road', this $17 billion project is poised to rival both China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor – neither of which traverses through Iraq. By substantially cutting shipping times, it could emerge as a pivotal linkage between Asia and Europe.
Erdogan visited Baghdad and the capital of the semi-autonomous Kurdish region on 22 April, meeting with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani and his counterpart Abdul Latif Rashid in Baghdad. The Turkish president later flew to Erbil for meetings with Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Nechirvan Barzani and Prime Minister Masrour Barzani.
The visit follows years of rocky relations between the two neighbours, with disagreements brewing over water resources and oil exports. Turkey maintains a military presence in northern Iraq, where it has established several military bases and has been regularly conducting airstrikes against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), where the insurgent group has its headquarters in the mountainous regions of Iraqi Kurdistan.
The PKK - which Turkey, alongside the US, EU and UK have designated a terrorist organisation - has been waging an insurgency against Turkey since 1984, seeking Kurdish self-rule. The conflict, whose epicentre moved in recent years from Turkey's southeast to northern Iraq, is commonly estimated to have killed between 30,000 and 40,000 people, including civilians.
Despite those tensions, Turkey has remained one of Iraq’s main trade partners, and Turkish goods have a dominant presence in Iraq. The recent deals promise to further bolster trade, as well as bilateral cooperation in the fields of energy, defence, tourism, education, sports, and health.
During Erdogan's visit, Iraq, Turkey, Qatar, and the UAE signed a quadrilateral memorandum of understanding to cooperate on the Development Road project. But obstacles remain - not least, the route of the project, which starts in the economic heart of Iraq, Basra, before moving on to Baghdad and Mosul via Tikrit, subsequently entering Turkey.
“With a few exceptions, this is a route that is very easy to destabilise, and to create security problems with just a tiny spark,” Osman Bahadir Dincer, a senior researcher at the Bonn International Centre for Conflict Studies (BICC) told The New Arab.
“The necessary security, political, and social infrastructure for such a project has not yet been put in place,” he added. “The Development Road project has the potential to be targeted by many actors, including [the Iran-backed] Hashd or other militias or Kurdish groups, or even by Daesh.”
Hashd al-Shaabi, also known as the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), emerged in 2014 as a response to combat the Islamic State (IS) and its influence has steadily grown since then. Concurrently, Baghdad finds itself with limited leverage over the presence of the PKK in northern Iraq.
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While recent gestures of goodwill towards Turkey include a ban on the group (albeit falling short of formally designating it a terrorist organisation), practical implementation of such measures remains challenging for the central government. Meanwhile, Turkey has been actively seeking approval from Baghdad for a potential large-scale military operation in northern Iraq this summer.
“A Turkish incursion and clashes with the PKK [would] destabilise the Kurdistan Region even further at a time when it’s dealing with existential threats,” Mohammed A. Salih, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute, tells The New Arab.
“The KRG [Kurdistan Regional Government] is in a tight spot, neither being able to stop a Turkish assault nor having any influence over the PKK to remove it from the border areas,” he added.
Except for the last 15 kilometres near the border with Turkey, the Development Road project is outside Iraq's semi-autonomous Kurdistan region.
“Excluding Kurdistan does not show goodwill from Baghdad towards the Kurds, as it demonstrates an intent to marginalise and disadvantage them strategically,” Salih said, explaining that the KRG's inclusion in the project will depend on relations with Baghdad and whether the two can reach a deal on a range of disputes, including oil exports, budget, and territorial control in certain areas.
Oil exports through the Kirkuk-Ceyhan oil pipeline from the KRG to Turkey have been halted since March last year, following an international arbitration court ruling that Ankara violated a 1973 treaty by facilitating exports without the consent of the Iraqi federal government. The pipeline's closure is estimated to have cost Iraq, particularly the KRG, between $11 and $12 billion.
Turkey has significant leverage over Iraq on the issue of water, as Iraq has been seeking a fair share from the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, which account for more than 90 percent of the country's freshwater. Turkey, which has built several dams on the rivers, has reportedly agreed to increase the flow of water to Iraq and help optimise its use in agriculture.
“Turkey is leveraging the water issue and Iraq’s desire for expanded regional trade to get what it wants with regard to the security siege and fighting the PKK,” says Salih.
An additional dimension, Dincer points out, is the possibility of the United States withdrawing from Iraq in light of Iranian pressure, the war in Gaza, as well as the upcoming US Presidential elections.
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“That is why all the relevant actors are trying to take a post-US position and, in the meantime, are looking for ways to increase their influence,” says Dincer. The Development Road project, if successful, would integrate Iraq into the Gulf-Europe trade system, leaving it less dependent on Iran.
“Regional geopolitics have entered a very dynamic and volatile phase,” he further emphasises.
“Even though the recent visits and agreements signed give the impression that the ongoing interaction between Turkey and Iraq is linked to the Development Road and economic cooperation, this is not the case,” Dincer says.
“For many local and regional actors, and perhaps most importantly for the Iraqi people, this project has not generated much excitement and is not a priority, except for Iraqi Prime Minister Sudani.”
Ylenia Gostoli is a reporter currently based in Istanbul, Turkey. She has covered politics, social change, and conflict across the Middle East and Europe. Her work on refugees, migration, and human trafficking has won awards and grants.
Follow her on Twitter: @YleniaGostoli