For more than nine months, the United States has been engaged in an open-ended - and congressionally unauthorised - military campaign against Yemen’s Houthi movement.
Citing Israel’s war in Gaza as their primary motive, Yemen’s Houthis began attacking shipping vessels transiting the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait in November 2023.
In response, Washington launched a retaliatory campaign in the hopes of stopping such attacks, constituting what US Navy officials describe as the most intense running sea battle the United States has faced since World War II.
The problem, however, is that it’s not working.
Washington’s approach to the Houthis is the epitome of strategic malpractice. It won’t work, costs too much, jeopardises the lives of American servicemembers stationed in the region to protect primarily foreign vessels, and risks further destabilising Yemen as well as the broader region.
Moreover, though the Houthis maintain their own unique incentives, Washington’s refusal to acknowledge Israel’s war in Gaza as the original catalyst of the Houthis’ attacks prevents any hopes of stopping these attacks in the Red Sea.
Washington should immediately end its military activity against the Houthis, press European and Asian states to take a more proactive role in protecting their own shipping vessels, and stop subsidising Israel’s war in Gaza in the hopes of de-escalating rising tensions across the Middle East.
There are three main problems with Washington’s current Houthi strategy.
First, it is devoid of concrete and achievable political objectives while burdening American taxpayers with inordinate costs. Since November 2023, the Houthis have conducted roughly 200 drone and missile attacks targeting commercial and military vessels in the Red Sea, sinking two vessels and killing at least three sailors.
In turn, the United States reached for its usual Middle East playbook - military force - spearheading Operation Prosperity Guardian in December 2023, and Operation Poseidon Archer in January 2024.
According to US officials, these efforts are meant to “restore deterrence”. The United States has already shot down over 150 Houthi drones and missiles. Compared to the Houthis’ missiles and drones - each costing around $2,000 - the US Navy’s missiles used to shoot down these projectiles cost American taxpayers millions of dollars.
So far, Washington has spent over $1 billion on munitions to strike the Houthis and intercept incoming missiles and drones.
Yet, these efforts have failed to deter the Houthis, nor are they likely to. Put simply, they see the benefits of conducting these attacks - namely, the political benefit of brandishing their defence of the Palestinian cause - as far outweighing the costs being imposed by the United States.
In fact, the majority of the attacks perpetrated by the Houthis happened after the United States and its partners began their retaliatory campaign, showing plainly that US efforts have failed to deter further violence.
The US is also unlikely to considerably degrade the Houthi’s capabilities to the point that they can no longer attack vessels transiting the Red Sea. After nearly 10 years of fighting against Saudi-led forces - supported by the United States - they have proven adept at the “shoot and scoot” method of combat and their weapons are cheap, highly mobile, and dispersed across Yemen.
What’s ironic is that US officials recognise the disconnect between this military campaign and its ostensible political aims.
Rear Admiral George Wikoff, the US Naval commander in charge of Operation Prosperity Guardian, noted in February that the group “has not been deterred.” In August, Wikoff explained a solution to this conflict “is not going to come at the end of a weapons system.”
But President Biden best summed up this disconnect when asked about US airstrikes against the Houthis: “Are they stopping the Houthis? No. Are they going to continue? Yes.”
Though the Houthis’ attacks have disrupted global shipping and freedom of navigation through the Red Sea, America’s tit-for-tat military engagement has not resolved this issue. Commercial shipping traffic through the Red Sea has decreased considerably as a result of the Houthis’ attacks.
There has been a significant effort to re-route these vessels - the majority of which are bound for Europe - which has led to increased shipping costs and some delays, namely for European vessels and consumers.
However, this does not constitute a death knell for the global economy. The greatest impact has been on the profit margins of certain companies due to higher fuel costs and increased insurance premiums. But America’s military campaign is arguably making the situation worse, fueling the conflict and resulting in more ships coming under fire from the Houthis.
Moreover, safeguarding these sea lanes is, as the Pentagon acknowledges, “an international problem that requires an international solution,” not the sole responsibility of the American taxpayer.
Washington would be wise to recognise this, and should instead press European and Asian states to take a more proactive role in defending Red Sea shipping, given that they have more vessels transiting these waters than the US.
Second, continued military exchanges between the United States and the Houthis risk further destabilising an already war-torn Yemen.
The brutal Saudi-UAE campaign in Yemen - supported by the United States - quickly devoured the country, killing more than 377,000 people and producing one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises.
After nine years of ruinous war, the conflict in Yemen has largely been at a standstill, primarily due to the inability of Saudi Arabia and the UAE to defeat the Houthis and fractures among anti-Houthi forces in Yemen.
In April 2022, the UN mediated a two-month ceasefire between the parties and, despite having formally expired, the truce has largely held, with both sides reaping the benefits in avoiding a resurgence of fighting: Saudi Arabia desires a swift exit from a war it has lost, while the Houthis wish to consolidate their position in Yemen as the country’s preeminent political and military force.
However, the Houthis used the aftermath of Hamas’ 7 October attacks to challenge Israel and the United States amid growing international outcry over the war in Gaza. This has allowed the Houthis to further consolidate their image as the face of the Yemeni state, while also deflecting criticism away from their own autocratic rule.
UN-led discussions to end this disastrous conflict are now at a standstill, hindered by ongoing military exchanges between the United States and the Houthis. Continued US military action against the group risks jeopardising the fragile, tacit, truce between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis while also threatening to compound Yemen’s economic and humanitarian crisis.
Finally, the conflict between the United States and the Houthis risks exacerbating growing regional tensions, pushing the Middle East toward region-wide war.
In the almost 11 months since Israel’s war in Gaza began, the Middle East has seen a surge in military escalation stretching across the region. Current hostilities between the Houthis and the United States are rooted in this context.
Like the rest of the region, the conflict with the Houthis continues to worsen. In July, the Houthis successfully fired a drone from Yemen that impacted an apartment building near the United States Embassy in Tel Aviv, killing at least one person and injuring several others.
In response, a squadron of Israeli F-15s and F-35s struck Yemen’s Houthi-controlled Hodeidah port, killing six dockworkers and injuring dozens.
With no end in sight to the war in Gaza and fears of regional war growing, Yemen has the potential to be a significant flashpoint in such a conflict. If the goal of the United States is to persuade the Houthis into stopping their attacks and avoid being sucked into another regional war, military force is extremely unlikely to achieve these objectives.
There are no vital US national interests at stake in Yemen that justify this level of American military involvement, or the billions of dollars of US taxpayer money being squandered. Instead, the best option is for Washington to end its aimless tit-for-tat exchanges with the Houthis and recognise that its emphatic embrace of Israel’s war in Gaza is destabilising the broader region to the detriment of US interests.
A ceasefire in Gaza holds the best chance of ending, or at least considerably suppressing, the attacks by Houthis as well as rising tensions across the Middle East.
This article originally appeared on Responsible Statecraft.