Having repeatedly sided with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) over Iran in a long-standing dispute regarding three Gulf islands, Moscow appears to be risking its ties with Tehran.
The Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa islands in the Strait of Hormuz were taken over by Iran in 1971 after British forces withdrew from the UAE following the country's independence, but Abu Dhabi has continually asserted its claim.
Last year, Russia took Iran by surprise when it signed a joint statement in favour of the UAE at a July summit between Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states and the Russian Federation.
The statement called for either bilateral negotiations or the International Court of Justice to resolve the issue “in accordance with the rules of international law and the United Nations Charter”.
In response, Iran’s foreign ministry summoned the Russian envoy to Tehran and asked him to correct Moscow’s “position on the issue”.
In December, Russia again endorsed the Emirati position on the islands in a joint declaration after the sixth Russian-Arab Cooperation Forum in Morocco.
Accompanied by a delegation, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov was part of the assembly of ministers which described Iran’s control over the islands as “continued occupation”.
In a vehement response, Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Nasser Kana’ani stressed that the islands “eternally belong to Iran” and are an inseparable part of the country.
According to Tehran, the three islands temporarily fell under British control in 1903 until they were returned to Iran under an agreement in 1971 before the UAE became independent.
Like China, which also sided with the UAE over the island dispute in December 2022, Moscow’s position appears to be a calculation to side with GCC states over Iran.
Aside from this issue, Russia and Iran’s bilateral ties had been at an all-time high both militarily and economically ever since Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine.
“Russia’s position on the three Iranian islands in the Persian Gulf, and the subsequent reactions in Iran, clearly illustrates the differing perceptions of the Iranian and Russian sides regarding the essence of their bilateral relationship,” Hamidreza Azizi, Visiting Fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin, told The New Arab.
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“The Iranian government, particularly the administration of Ebrahim Raisi, is vigorously endeavouring to depict its relationship with Russia as a comprehensive strategic partnership or even an alliance,” he added.
“Conversely, despite recent years witnessing an expansion in Iran-Russia cooperation, Moscow remains intent on striking a balance in its relations with Iran on one side and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf on the other.”
Abolfazl Beheshti, Professor of International Relations and Member of the Board of Directors in the Community of House of Europe in Brussels, told The New Arab that, “Russian-Iranian ties are normal. However, the Iranian government believes this is a strategic relationship which it is not. This is an illusion on the Iranian side”.
He elaborated that, “Russia like China has strategic interests in relations with the Arab countries, Israel, and the West. Moscow like Beijing will never sacrifice its relations with those countries for having strategic relations with Iran”.
On the domestic front, Russia’s stance provoked criticism from various Iranian lawmakers, with one of them, Ebrahim Rezaei, suggesting that Iran could also “invite the Russians to negotiate with Japan over the Kuril Islands”, referring to a four-island dispute between the two countries.
Given these developments, where do Russia-Iran ties currently stand, and where are they heading? Principally, the Iran-Russia bilateral equation is more like a defence partnership.
While visiting Tehran in September, Russia’s Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu said that both sides would be aiming at an “entire range of planned activities” despite opposition and sanctions. He also visited facilities where Iranian drones, missiles, and air defence systems were displayed.
“Iran, also burdened by international sanctions, is motivated to collaborate with Russia to bypass these restrictions through various initiatives, including transit and financial projects,” Azizi explained.
“Moreover, Iran, alongside North Korea, stands as one of the few states willing to offer military support to Russia during the Ukraine war.”
Iran has not only sold armed drones to Russia, but it has also even been helping Moscow build a drone factory inside Russia.
“Despite the competition between the two countries in selling cheap oil due to Western sanctions and involving both countries in the battle scene with the West, both sides need each other to circumvent the sanctions and the need for strategic weapon-political energy-depth,” Beheshti observed.
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However, considering Iran’s limited ability to pay Russia for any weapons or missile systems, military relations may remain short-term and one-sided.
Economically, Moscow does not have much to offer Tehran and it has even been accused of selling it goods at a ‘higher price’. Even transit routes, such as the International North-South Transit Corridor (INSTC), have failed to progress due to a lack of investment and sanctions against Iran.
Nevertheless, Iran and Russia still prefer to trade in their local currencies instead of the US dollar and both have finalised an agreement in this regard recently.
UAE-Russia ties
On the other hand, Russia has a lot to gain from the UAE. Being under punitive international sanctions, it is looking for better trade prospects and Russia-UAE trade increased by 68 % in 2022, consisting mainly of Russian exports to the UAE (around $8.5 billion).
“The UAE’s significance to Russia is primarily economic, rooted in its potential for investment, so it adopts a compartmentalised approach in its Middle East policy, trying to balance economic, military, and security considerations,” Azizi told TNA.
“Instances such as Russia’s stance on the three Iranian islands and the strong backlash in Iran against Moscow’s position highlight the limitations of Russia’s balancing act across the Persian Gulf.”
Azizi said that it’s hard to tell whether Russia is closer to Iran or the UAE as it perceives different interests in its relationships with each country.
For example, “Iran, as an anti-Western political system, becomes a significant ally for the Kremlin, especially at a time when global confrontations between Russia and the West are intensifying”.
Azizi added that Russia’s willingness to accommodate the positions of the UAE and Saudi Arabia has a strategic dimension, linked to these countries’ close ties with the United States.
“Essentially, Russia seeks to demonstrate that, by intensifying cooperation with the West’s traditional allies in the region, efforts to isolate Moscow have been ineffective. Consequently, Russia is prepared to politically support the UAE’s stance on the islands in exchange for these vital benefits.”
Meanwhile, in Beheshti's opinion, “Iran’s strategic position and its control over the Straits of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb, which is very vital for the Russians, forces them to seek leverage in order to contain Iran and what excuse would be better than the issue of three islands in the Strait of Hormuz”.
Notwithstanding the optics, all three parties, Moscow, Abu Dhabi, and Tehran are well aware that nothing will come of these joint statements with the GCC, and Iran fully intends to retain its control over the three islands.
At the end of the day, playing all its cards helps Russia maintain regional relevance and negate the impression that it has been isolated after the Ukraine war.
Sabena Siddiqui is a foreign affairs journalist, lawyer and geopolitical analyst specialising in modern China, the Belt and Road Initiative, Middle East and South Asia.
Follow her on Twitter: @sabena_siddiqi